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LABOR, LUCK, AND LOVE: RECONSIDERING THE
SANCTITY OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
Shari Motro •
"Marriage is a proclamation that one need not battle alone the vicissitudes
that life can bring, but can rely on a partner to share the burdens of living
in what sometimes seems a capricious and indifferent universe. ''"~
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Most jurisdictions' current family law systems embody the principle
that marriage turns separate individuals into economic partners. If marriage
ends, the fruits ofboth spouses' labor-the earnings accumulated by either
spouse during marriage-are classified as marital property subject to division at divorce. Assets acquired before marriage and gifts or inheritances
Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., Yale University; J.D.,
New York University School of Law. I am thankful to Christopher Cotropia, Hanoch Dagan, Ira Mark
Ellman, Jessica Erickson, James Gibson, Corinna Lain, Kristen Osenga, Noah Sachs, Jana B. Singer,
Benjamin Spencer, and Peter Swisher for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and to
the faculties at the University of Georgia School of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark, and Brooklyn
Law School for their probing responses to talks I delivered there. I am also thankful to my research assistants Lauren Dickey and Graham Magill. The graphic illustrations were designed by Ehud
Tal/Empax in consultation with Matthew Woolman. A research grant from the University of Richmond
School of Law helped fund this work.
t MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 147 (1993).
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received during marriage, on the other hand, generally belong to each
spouse separately. The classification of these assets as sacrosanct separate
property means that they are sheltered from division at divorce. Thus, labor-generated property presumptively belongs to spouses as a unit, while
premarital and luck-generated (gifted or inherited) property belongs to
spouses as separate individuals. Why the difference?
Earnings from labor are marital property because marriage is considered a joint venture to which each spouse contributes a combination of effort, sacrifice, and mutual support. Regardless of the relative market value
of spouses' contributions, the law grants each spouse a right to the economic fruits of the marriage under the theory that spouses' monetary and
nonmonetary contributions are of equal importance to the marriage. This
arrangement also guarantees that homemakers are indirectly compensated
for their nonwage labor without subjecting them to uncomfortable investigations into the market value of their contributions.
Unlike spouses' marital earnings, property acquired before marriage
and gifts and inheritances received during marriage are regarded as external
to the marital economic partnership. Property acquired before marriage
cannot be said to be a product of spouses' joint venture because the labor
expended to produce it preceded their union. Gifts and inheritances received during marriage, the theory goes, likewise cannot be said to be a
product of the spouses' collective efforts. By definition, gifts and inheritances are not compensation for labor; they result from donors' altruistic
impulses to give without expecting anything in return. Gifts and inheritances in particular are also kept separate from the joint marital pot out of
respect for donors' intentions. ·
The notion that assets should be treated differently based on whether
they came into the marriage through spouses' labor permeates most scholarly, statutory, and judicial discussions of marital property law. But with
the exception of recent proposals by the American Law Institute (ALI) and
by Carolyn Frantz and Hanoch Dagan, this labor-centered marital property
rule has gone largely unquestioned. Indeed, some commentators take the
labor-based classification paradigm as too self-evident to justify.' In reality,
the theory and its application are riddled with inconsistencies.
1

See 1. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219, 250 (1989)
("[T]he distinction between separate property and marital property ... is perceived by most people as
fair. There seems to be general acceptance today that spouses should share the fruits of the marital partnership, but not other property."); Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or
Death, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 1227, 1237-38 ("All fifty states are ... guided, at least to some degree, by a
partnership theory of marriage when considering how to distribute property in the context of divorce,
and most scholars and advocates have come to take the theory for granted. Indeed, most recent scholarship and policy proposals do not question the partnership theory, but instead focus on how both separate
property and community property states can more faithfully implement the theory at divorce."); see also
Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law Provides a
Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567 (1995); Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of
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First, the labor-centered rule naively assumes that spouses with utiequal separate holdings will be equally invested in the marriage as a joint
venture. In many cases, spouses with widely divergent wealth have a disproportionate exposure to risk. As a result, they may not expend the same
efforts toward income production-both before and during marriage. A law
school graduate with a $10 million safety net is less likely to prioritize economic considerations in her choice of career path than one who enters the
profession empty-handed or in debt. Where a born-rich dilettante marries a
self-made professional, the labor-centered rule strictly applied produces
perverse results-only the worker is forced to share.
Also, the line between acquisitions attributable to marital labor and
those attributable to other factors-like premarital labor and sheer luck-is
impossible to draw accurately. Many gifts and inheritances are not the result of pure altruism, but rather reflect, at least in part, a quid pro quo, an
unarticulated exchange. On the flip side, earnings are rarely attributable
solely to contemporaneous effort. Most often, earnings reflect a combination of past and current labor, as well as circumstances over which the individual worker has little control--circumstances that can often be traced to
gifts, favors, or inherited privilege. An individual's education, cultural fluency, and professional contacts accessed through social and familial networks are just some of the lucky breaks that impact financial success.
Finally, the labor-centered partnership theory conflicts with widely
held intuitions and typical practices in ongoing marriages. Property that
would be considered separate as a legal matter is hardly ever kept wholly
separate from the marriage. Rather, propertied spouses tend to share more
and more of their individual assets as marriage progresses, mixing laborand luck-generated property as their relationship grows and deepens. 2
These problems may explain why in practice, deviations from the labor-centered rule abound. Various judicial trends and divorce doctrinesincluding transmutation by use, 3 commingling of separate and marital property,4 and the treatment of income from and appreciation of separate prop-

Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the
Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487 (2000).
2
See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS§ 4.12 cmt. a (2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES) ("After many years of marriage,
spouses typically do not think of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they would be so
classified under the technical rules. Both spouses are likely to believe, for example, that such assets will
be available to provide for their joint retirement, for a medical crisis of either spouse, or for the other
personal emergencies. The longer the marriage the more likely it is that the spouses will have made decisions about their employment or the use of their marital assets that are premised in part on such expectations about the separate property of both spouses.").
3 This doctrine recharacterizes separate property that has been used by both spouses-e.g., a family
home-as marital property. See infra Part III.B.
4
This doctrine treats accounts and property traceable to a combination of separate and marital funds
as entirely marital property. See infra Part III.B.
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ertyS-effectively erode the labor-centered rule by assigning to the marriage
property that, according to partnership theory, should belong to spouses
separately.
Though these backdoor solutions address some inconsistencies in the
current rule, they create other problems. For one, they are largely dependent on judicial discretion. As such they are unpredictable, they prolong and
complicate settlement negotiations, and they raise the economic and emotional costs of divorce. Separate property is sacrosanct in theory, but in reality a given divorce could result in the division of marital earnings and
other property to an alarmingly unpredictable extent.
Additionally, some of the doctrines overreach. For example, the
transmutation of separate property that is shared during marriage penalizes
propertied spouses for their generosity and produces a windfall for their
mates. The rule thus puts propertied spouses in a bind. On the one hand,
sharing their wealth exposes them to the risk that everything they own will
be subject to division at divorce. On the other hand, keeping property separate when their hearts are ready to share may poison their chance at building
a flourishing marriage based on love and trust:
Even before marriage, the current paradigm may damage relations.
Because the economic implications of marriage are so uncertain, courting
couples are left to their own devices in imagining a conceptual framework
for dealing with unequal resources. Those who choose to write their own
private marriage contracts swim in treacherous waters, as the process of
reaching this agreement can become adversarial, with each party advised by
lawyers dedicated to maximizing their individual clients' advantages.
The lack of clear legal and societal guidance on how much, if any, unearned and premarital wealth should be shared in marriage means that couples who cannot invent a sharing philosophy that strikes both parties as fair
and safe have two options: live in conflict or split up. Those who do strike
a balance must constantly renegotiate their sharing arrangement as circumstances change. This process forces them to repeatedly confront their
power imbalance. "In cross-class marriages, one partner will usually have
more money, more options, and, almost inevitably, more power in the relationship," explains one reporter of "marriages of unequals." 6 The law's silence on how much sharing is fair leaves laypeople to grapple on their own
with a moral and philosophical challenge that often eludes judges and family law experts alike. 7
5

See infra Part 111.8 for a discussion concerning the varied treatments of appreciation of and income from separate property.
6
Tamar Lewin, A Marriage ofUnequals, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,2005, at AI.
7
As one affluent wife put it, "I ... feel the awkwardness of helping [my son] buy a car, when I'm
not helping [my husband's daughters] .... But I also have to be aware of overstepping." /d. The
woman recalls wanting to help when these daughters' mother's house burned down. "I took out my
checkbook," she said, "and I didn't know what was appropriate .... Emily Post doesn't deal with these
situations." /d.
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A different paradigm is clearly needed. The partnership theory's exclusive focus on labor is inconsistent with what most Americans presume
marriage means8 and with what civil marriage should mean in a society that
values fairness and strives to create the best conditions for flourishing, loving relationships. Marriage is not fundamentally about equal contribution
of labor. It is about two people joining the risks and rewards of their lives:
merging their fates, committing to be "in the same boat," to sink or swim
together, to contribute unequally at times if that's what it takes to keep the
union afloat.
When a sick husband checks into the hospital and becomes fully supported by his wife or when a wife leaves her job to care for her ailing parent
knowing she can rely on her husband's income, labor contributions to the
"joint venture" are clearly unequal. If the hospitalized husband or the wife
caring for her parent subsequently inherits a small fortune, they are likely to
share it with their wage-earning spouse. Marriage fuses separate individuals into one unit in which efforts, consumption, goals, and decisionmaking
are intertwined. The law should treat it accordingly.
This Article proposes a new alternative to the labor-centered marital
property rule. Instead of focusing on how property was acquired, marital
property law should look to spouses' overall financial resources and require
them to share these resources to the extent they shape their identities during
the marriage. Financial capability affects some of the most fundamental
aspects of our lives-our health, our education, our work, the neighborhood
in which we live. Marriages in which these aspects of spouses' identities
are kept separate strike us as jarring. Imagine a husband and wife who
sleep in the same bed, under the same roof, but who receive dramatically
different levels of medical care.
I do not propose that all preexisting, gifted, and inherited property belong to the marriage. Rather, the approach introduced in this Article attributes a percentage of separate property to the marriage based on the length of
the marriage and on the property owner's life expectancy. The core concept
is to spread separate property over the life of the owner spouse and to allocate to the marriage a pro rata portion of this property. 9
8

Lisa Mahle, A Purse of Her Own: The Case Against Joint Bank Accounts, !6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
45, 4 7--48 (2007) ("One of the most comprehensive studies of American couples found that a large majority of married Americans believe that married couples 'should pool all their property and financial
assets.' The ideal of sharing is so strong that courts and academic commentators often simply assume
that happy couples pool their resources." (citing PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN
COUPLES 101 (1983))); Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence
in Spousal Economic Relations 3 (May 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("[B]roadly sharing resources is an entrenched social norm and is also overwhelmingly what spouses
actually do."). Note, however, that the extent to which this sharing ideal is followed in practice is debatable. See Shari Motro, A New "!Do": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REv.
1509, 1523-24 nn.47-51 (2006).
9
A graphic illustration of the concept appears in Part IV.A.
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For example, suppose a person marries at age thirty with $1 million in
premarital property. Suppose also that actuarial tables project that this
spouse will live to age eighty. The couple then gets divorced ten years into
the marriage (one-fifth of the way through the owning spouse's fifty-year
life expectancy). In that case $200,000 (one-fifth of $1 million) would be
classified as marital property subject to division. This $200,000 represents
a rough measure of what the $1 million means to the owner spouse for the
duration of the marriage-a rough translation of the psychological cushion
the property provides. Attributing this amount as well as all spousal earnings to the marriage means that for its duration, husband and wife experience the economic risks and dangers of life together. This approach ensures
that workers and owners invest more comparably in the marriage than under
the current rule, regardless of their inclinations, abilities, or motivations to
generate income. At the same time, propertied spouses would be free to
share their wealth without the fear that doing so would automatically convert it to marital property. Finally, spouses with disproportionate resources
would be given an objective, rational, and fair conceptual foundation for
charting a joint life plan, a foundation designed to ease the anxiety that financial imbalances can produce when a couple builds a home, plans for retirement, or contemplates raising children.
Part I introduces the labor-centered rule and explains its theoretical underpinning-the partnership theory of marriage. Part II critiques the prevailing paradigm. First, it argues that the current rule is theoretically
inconsistent. Second, it shows that a wide range of caselaw and statutory
provisions deviate from the principle. Finally, it reviews two recent proposals that challenge the labor-centered rule. Both proposals are promising
but incomplete. Part III builds upon these proposals and offers an alternative to the current treatment of premarital and unearned property: A classification paradigm that ensures that spouses join risks and rewards by
contributing comparably out of their overall financial capability, regardless
of the property's source.
Before proceeding, a few provisos are warranted. First, this Article focuses exclusively on the classification of property at divorce because the legal manifestations of the labor-centered paradigm are most explicit in
decisions regarding divorce property settlements. That said, the proposal's
ramifications are important in shaping ongoing marriages. As Frantz and
Dagan put it:
[Because] the legal rules surrounding marital property ... apply most often at
the moment of divorce, commentators tend to focus more on their impact on
divorced and divorcing couples than on ongoing marital relationships. But
these rules are centrally about marriage, even marriages so successful they ultimately do not have to use them. Through marital property law, the state has
the opportunity to help shape the social understanding of marriage, and thus
the actions of those who partake in it. . . . [G]ovemance rules operate during
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marriage ... to shape spouses' expectations and behavior with respect to marital property. 10

Second, this Article is concerned with a backward-looking assessment
of how much, if any, of what is traditionally defined as separate property
should be subject to division as part of the property settlement at divorce. It
is not concerned with postmarital earnings or with the needs of the spouses
going forward. These issues are generally addressed through alimony or
spousal support. 11 Although in many cases neither spouse owns any separate property and the earnings accumulated in the course of marriage are insufficient to provide for the nonearner or secondary earner going forward,
much scholarship has already been devoted to the postdivorce needs of dependent spouses. 12 Almost none has challenged the separate property principle. This Article begins to fill in that gap. 13
Third, this Article is not concerned with the question of whether fault
should be a relevant factor in the division of marital property. For one, the
issue has already received extensive scholarly attention. 14 More importantly, the marital property concept introduced below is equally relevant to

10

Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 76 (2004)
(footnote omitted).
11
On the distinction between property division and alimony as conceptual frameworks, see id. at
99-100 ("We use property division and alimony to signify different substantive considerations: Property
division is backward-looking (looking at the marital relationship while it existed), while alimony reflects
the law's concern with the postdivorce financial situation of the parties, their future needs, and their prospective abilities.").
12
See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 15-51 (1985); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory
of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. I (1989); Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce:
Would Adoption of the ALI Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119
(2001); Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution
at Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 141 (2004); Jana B. Singer, Divorce
Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers:
Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1513 (2005); Joan Williams, Do Wives Own
Half? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REv. 249 (1999) [hereinafter Williams, Do Wives
Own Half?]; Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory ofAlimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227
(I 994).
13
It should be noted however, that while this work does not address postdivorce earnings, the proposal advanced is not inconsistent with a more robust system of alimony. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb,
Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. FAM. L. 351 (1989); Singer, supra note
12. Nor is it inconsistent with a property division model that includes increases in earning capacity in
marital property. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note I 0, at I 07-12.
14
See, e.g., Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution on Property Division, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 891; Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern
Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1996); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on
No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. I (1987); Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles: A Farewell to Fault-But What Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive
Spouse?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 213 (2001); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Katharine T. Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse ofFault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994).
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fault-based and no-fault regimes. The choice between the two is therefore
extraneous to this investigation.
Fourth, at first glance, this Article may appear inapplicable to the minority of states that subject all property to division at divorce-so-called
"hotchpot," "kitchen sink," or "all property" states. 15 But while these states
do not distinguish between marital and separate property at the outset of divorce proceedings, at the distribution stage they too tend toward the same
labor-centered paradigm, usually awarding most or all preexisting, gifted,
and inherited property to the owner spouse. 16
A similar analysis explains the relevance of this discussion to noncommunity property states. For much of this country's history, only community property states classified the fruits of spouses' labor as marital and
preserved other property as separate. 17 But non-community property jurisdictions have now adopted an essentially identical paradigm through equitable distribution regimes 18 that come into play at divorce. 19 The proposal is
thus applicable nationwide.
Finally, this Article does not aim to dismiss reforms that have made divorce more equitable over the last three decades. On the contrary, the partnership model and the equitable distribution revolution it inspired laid the
groundwork for this project. Equitable distribution represents a marked improvement compared to the dominant title theory of marriage that preceded

15

See J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY§ 3.03(2)
(2007).
16
See FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE§ 37.06 {Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2006) {"In some states, property
acquired by gift or inheritance is subject to equitable distribution. In such states, statutes may permit a
court to consider the source of such property as a factor in making an equitable distribution. Moreover,
judicial decisions in these states may afford a degree of protection for property acquired by gift or inheritance, even if the statute provides that such property is subject to equitable distribution."); Gary, supra note I, at 574 {"In seventeen states, all property owned by either spouse is subject to division.
Courts in these states can still consider the origin of the property in order to determine distribution.");
Oldham, supra note I, at 220 ("[E]ven kitchen sink states seem increasingly inclined to award 'separate'
property to the owning spouse."). For a historical note on the increasing trend toward a dual- rather than
all-property regime, see Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present
and Future, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 807, 827-28.
17
This "community system ofacquests" originated in the seventh century in Visigothic Spain. See
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGI-IN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 3 (2d ed.
1971).
18
For this reason, this Article will refer to "marital property" as synonymous with "community
property." See Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 354 ("All common law states now permit equitable distribution of property at divorce, thereby recognizing that both spouses have been partners in acquiring property during the marriage regardless of which spouse holds title."); see also OLDHAM, supra note 15,
§ 5.03[1); John DeWitt Gregory, The ALI Property Division Principles: A Model of Radical Paternalism, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 163, 166 n.21 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
19
During marriage, community and non-community property states remain distinct. In community
property states, each spouse has a one-half interest in earnings upon their receipt. See DE FUNIAK &
VAUGHN, supra note 17, § 66. In the other states, spouses hold individual title to their earnings unless
and until divorce proceedings commence, at which point the earnings are classified as marital. !d.
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it. 20 The shift from title theory to equitable distribution turned many nonand low-earning spouses from dependents with almost no property rights at
divorce into full-fledged partners in a joint enterprise-if not in practice,
then at least in theory. This Article contends that the revolution was incomplete: marital property should include labor-generated property as well
as the portion of luck-generated and premarital property allocable to the
marriage. Partnership-based equitable distribution may be preferable to title
theory, but it did not go far enough. This Article takes the next step.
II. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CURRENT SYSTEM: THE
PARTNERSHIP THEORY OF MARRIAGE

A. The Marital Property Rule
The most prevalent justification for the rule classifying spouses' earnings as marital is known variously as the partnership theory of marriage, 21
the contribution theory/ 2 the joint property theory,Z 3 or the marital-sharing
theory. 24 Partnership theory, as it is most widely used, refers to the principle that both spouses should be entitled to earnings acquired by either
spouse because both spouses' direct and indirect contributions generated
this income. It should be noted that although the "partnership theory of
marriage" frequently refers to the marital property regime centered on contribution of labor that is the focus of this Article, this is not always the

20

Under the title theory of marriage, which guided divorce proceedings in non-community property
states until the 1970s, earnings remained titled in the name of their nominal earner-usually the husband. If the wife had not caused the divorce, she was generally granted relief in the form of alimony-a
support award designed to enable her to maintain the lifestyle to which she was accustomed. Alimony
was based on projected needs rather than retroactive entitlement; it was not tied to the amount of property acquired during the marriage, and it was not conceived as compensation for the wife's efforts to assist in the husband's income production. See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 3.02[1). But contrary to
popular perceptions, alimony was often quite limited. See Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 366-67.
21
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.04 ("[U)se of the term ['partnership') is metaphorical and
the analogy imperfect. It has become a common way, however, by which to describe the central principle that marriage involves the commitment of both spouses' labors, during their marriage, to the family."). On the partnership theory of marriage generally, see Helene S. Shape, "A Tale of Two Systems":
Anglo-American Problems in the Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. L. REv. 707, 722
(1993); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv. 21,44 (1994).
22
See, e.g., Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 89 ("Some scholars have argued that a liberal marriage must ... include a commitment to giving each spouse what are singularly the fruits of his or her
contribution.").
23
See, e.g., Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half?, supra note 12, at 265 ("If an asset is produced by
two family members, it makes no sense to award ownership to only one of them.").
24
See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 21, at 43 ("Under [the marital-sharing theory], the economic
rights of each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken or imputed marital bargain under which the
partners agree that each is to enjoy a half interest in the economic production of the marriage .... ").

1631

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

case. 25 Still, because partnership has come to be used as shorthand for this
contribution-of-labor idea, this Article will follow this convention. The
theory comes in two forms: a descriptive, contract-based form and a restitutionary, normative form. 26
The contract-based version of the partnership theory applies a retroactive assumption that if the parties had explicitly delineated the terms of their
union at the outset, they would have agreed that the fruits of both spouses'
labor would accrue to the marriage as a unit. According to this "hypothetical bargain" notion, 27 marriage implies an agreement to pool earnings. 28
Property earned in the course of marriage should thus be classified as marital to match the parties' expectations and reliance interests. 29
The normative version of the partnership theory imposes a sharedearnings rule on the parties regardless of whether they would have agreed to
it based on a moral, restitutionary "return-of-contribution" notion. 30 This
approach recognizes that spouses who earn less generally have less bargaining power, but insists that they be treated as equally deserving members of
25

See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 21, at 722 ("[T]he partnership relationship of an ongoing marriage is
more accurately described as 'a sharing of goods from each according to ability, to each according to
need."').
26
See Shahar Lifshitz, On Past Assets and Future Assets, and on the Philosophy of Mutual Spousal
Assets in Israeli Law, 34 MISHPATIM 627, 647-57 (2004) (Isr.).
27
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 687,
723.
28
See id. at 725 ("It is plausible to posit that modern married couples typically understand ownership of assets during marriage to be shared property."); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Marriage as Relation Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1308 (1998) (predicting that most couples would
choose common ownership ex ante); Waggoner, supra note 21, at 43 ("Sometimes [the partnership theory] is portrayed 'as an expression of the presumed intent of husbands and wives to pool their fortunes
on an equal basis, share and share alike.' Under this approach, the economic rights of each spouse are
seen as deriving from an unspoken or imputed marital bargain under which the partners agree that each
is to enjoy a half interest in the economic production of the marriage, that is, in the property nominally
acquired by and titled in the sole name of either partner during the marriage (other than in property acquired by gift or inheritance)." (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION Of fAMILY
LAW: STATE, LAW, AND fAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 131 (!989))). But see
Lifshitz, supra note 26, at 727 (suggesting that the attempt to devise "neutral" rules mirroring society's
attitudes is futile because spouses' expectations are influenced by the existing legal system and that reformers should thus draft laws that both reflect existing mores and take_ responsibility for shaping new
ones).
29
See Scott, supra note 27, at 723-25 ("It seems improbable that most couples engaged in premarriage bargaining would agree to a quick and easy exit from marriage and minimal postdivorce familial
obligation."); Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1308 (asserting that equal distribution of property acquired during the marriage follows the approach that most couples would choose ex ante); Waggoner,
supra note 2 I, at 43 (noting that the partnership theory of marriage follows the assumption that spouses
intend to pool their resources equally).
30
See Lifshitz, supra note 26, at 650--657; Waggoner, supra note 21, at 43 ("Sometimes the theory
is visualized in restitutionary terms, a return-of-contribution notion."). Elizabeth Scott has argued in
particular that marriage most resembles a "relational contract." "In the commercial setting," she explains, "a relational contract is one that extends indefinitely over time, and that may serve multiple varied purposes, creating a complex interdependent relationship." Scott, supra note 27, at 723.
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the marital partnership based on fairness. 31 Non- or low-wage-earning
spouses often contribute substantially to their partners' earnings-both directly, by serving as informal consultants and advisors, and indirectly, by
managing the household and raising children. A rule designating earnings
as marital ensures that this labor is compensated. 32
Once divorcing spouses' marital earnings are determined, two approaches generally govern the eventual distribution of this marital property.
One divides the property based on a case-by-case calculus of the parties'
relative contributions and needs; the other requires an equal division of all
marital property without further inquiry. 33
Dividing marital property based on a case-by-case determination of
relative contribution is the most theoretically consistent practical manifestation of the partnership principle, and some equitable distribution schemes
require judges dividing marital property between the spouses to take both
monetary and nonmonetary contributions into account. 34 But many equitable distribution schemes take spouses' postdivorce needs into account as
well, a factor that frequently conflicts with the contribution factor. 35 In any
31

In most cases this more economically vulnerable spouse is the wife; thus, the normative form of
the insistence that all earnings be classified as marital was initially endorsed by many feminists. This
same approach, however, has also been criticized as detrimental to women. See Rosenbury, supra note
I, at 1233 ("[T]he partnership theory of marriage, while seemingly more egalitarian, may also reinforce
wifely sacrifice by rewarding women for caring for their husbands and children at the possible expense
of their own tangible property acquisition or other forms of individual fulfillment. The partnership theory thereby reinforces traditional gender role expectations allocating wage work to men and care work
to women . . . . [T]he partnership theory contributes to the perception that the allocation of wage work
to men and care work to women is a natural division oflabor as opposed to a societal construct.").
32
See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
33
Scholars disagree over whether and to what extent the equal division model prevails in practice.
Compare ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. a, reporter's notes cmt. b, Frantz & Dagan, supra
note I 0, at I 00-02 ("[Equal division is t]he cornerstone of contemporary law of marital property ...."),
Garrison, supra note 12, at 124 ("[O]nly a handful of states have equal statutory provisions establishing
equal division as a presumptive outcome[, but] a larger number have judicial precedents that establish
such a presumption or posit equal division as an analytical starting point."), and Williams, Do Wives
Own Half?, supra note 12, at 266-67 ("We should ... give the wife half the accumulated family wealth
based on her family work, without which that wealth could not have been created." (emphasis omitted)), with Papuchis v. Papuchis, 341 S.E.2d 829, 830 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to adopt a rebuttable presumption favoring equal division), and Rosenbury, supra note I, at 1237 ("[B]ecause the
standards guiding the distribution [of marital property] can often be vague, courts have much room to
determine that an unequal division is nonetheless equitable.").
34
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 reporter's notes cmt. c; Gary, supra note I. For scholarly
arguments in favor of including relative contribution as a factor in equitable distribution decisions, see
Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1272 (1998).
35
See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. a ("[S]tatutes typically provide the judge no guidance in weighing the relative importance of the various factors. Although these lists often include eight
or 10 factors, most of the factors are specific examples of two basic but conflicting principles: property
should be allocated in proportion to the spousal contributions to its acquisition, and property should be
allocated according to relative spousal need. These principles conflict because the relative contribution
of the spouses to the acquisition of marital property is usually inversely related to their relative financial
need at divorce.").
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case, ad hoc valuations of spouses' relative contributions and needs are burdensome and intrusive, and often mirror society's tendency to undervalue
nonmarket labor. 36 They also leave too much uncertainty as to the likely
outcome of any given divorce. 37 Finally, the case-by case approach requires
assigning an objective value to the nonmarket contributions of the non- or
low-earning spouse, something that many believe is undesirable and perhaps impossible. 38
Rather than leaving the division of marital property entirely in the
hands of judicial discretion, many jurisdictions and commentators support
an equal division rule or presumption. 39 One version of this model assumes
that a non-wage-earning spouse has indirectly earned half of the wage
earner's accumulated income. Thus, for example, because married men
earn more than unmarried men, wives-the argument goes-are responsible
for the additional income earned by virtue of their husbands' marital
status. 40 Adding this excess to the imputed income from wives' household
36
See Singer, supra note 12, at 1119 ("[D]ivorce doctrines that allow for substantial judicial discretion generally operate to women's disadvantage .... The absence of clear-cut legal standards also affects the negotiation process in ways that disadvantage the economically weaker party, generally the
woman, in divorce. Finally, the lack of precise standards ... may drive up the costs associated with divorce, particularly attorneys' fees, which again penalizes the economically weaker spouse.").
37
For a discussion on the drawbacks of broad judicial discretion over divorce, see ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. a ("[T]he decisional variability often found today in equitable-distribution systems arises at least in part because trial courts apply different principles as often as they face different
facts. Yet the resulting variability in the principles by which cases are decided is of course unjust.");
Oldham, supra note I, at 249-50 ("What is wrong with total judicial discretion in divorce decisions?
Indeed, this might permit a court to make additional provisions for a dependent spouse. Still, when no
limits are placed upon the divorce court's discretion, results in each state have been arbitrary.").
38
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. c. For arguments against commodification of
household labor, see Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 81, 84-85, 116-17 (1997); cf Barbara Freedman Wand & Ilana Hurwitz, The "Genius
Factor" and Equitable Distribution of Property at Divorce, BOSTON B.J., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 10, 26-27
(commenting on deCastro v. deCastro, 616 N.E.2d 52, 56 (Mass. 1993), in which the husband essentially argued that courts should consider a new factor, the "genius factor," when fashioning an equitable
distribution of property, and noting that "[i]f courts recognize a 'genius' factor and a 'supercontribution' theory as appropriate considerations in equitable distribution of property, one must also
consider the possibility of the recognition of a 'dunce' factor or 'inferior-contribution' theory, where one
spouse could claim that an employed spouse performed less proficiently than the ordinary spouse in his
profession, thus justifying a lesser portion of the marital assets to that spousf!').
39
Though early forms of the community property model-the progenitor of the labor-luck principle-employed a contribution-based division of community property, the dominant form of the model
contemplated equal division at divorce. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 142-43 ("In many
early forms of[ community property], the acquisitions, earnings and gains during the marriage were not
shared equally between the spouses but rather in proportion to the amount of property each had brought
or contributed to the marriage . . . . But by the time of the thirteenth century we find the Spanish law
providing that the spouses should share in these things equally, that is by the halves, irrespective of
whether one spouse was richer than the other, and this continued thereafter unchanged."); see also id. at
2-3; Gary, supra note I, at 572.
40
Note, however, that debate persists over whether the correlation between marital status and earnings results from a causal relationship between the two. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 re-
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and childrearing labor-the money saved by not contracting out for these
services41-might well entitle women to fifty percent of earnings. Wageearning women generally earn less than their husbands, but they make up
the difference (some more than make up the difference) by shouldering
most of the couple's domestic duties. 42 But most commentators view such
attempts at valuation as spurious. The more common justification for equal
division focuses "on spouses' contribution to the entire marital relationship,
not just to the accumulation of financial assets."43 Alternatively, rather than
presuming to reflect an accurate gauge of relative contribution, equal division embodies a general ideological and aspirational commitment to equalporter's notes cmt. c ("Married men ... earn more than unmarried men, which some observers take as
evidence of [the premise that one spouse's homemaker services add to the other spouse's earning capacity]."); Hal R. Varian, Analyzing the Marriage Gap, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2004, at C2 (pegging the
"marriage wage premium" at between ten and fifty percent and reporting on a study by economists Kate
Antonovics and Robert Town, which concluded that marriage has a causal impact on wages). Other observers suggest instead the converse explanation for married men's greater earnings: men with financial
promise are more likely to marry because they are more successful as suitors. One analysis of the data
concludes, however, that neither explanation for married men's earning advantage is correct but that instead, some third variable affects both male earnings and male marital prospects. Yinon Cohen & Yitchak Haberfeld, Why Do Married Men Earn More than Unmarried Men?, 20 Soc. SCI. RES. 29 (1991);
see also Christopher Cornwell & Peter Rupert, Unobservable Individual Effects, Marriage and the
Earnings of Young Men, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 285,285 (1997) (supporting Cohen and Haberfield in finding that most of the male earnings premium attributed to marriage "is associated with unobservable individual effects that are correlated with marital status and wages"). But see Sanders Korenman & David
Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282 (1991)
(finding that the effect of marriage on earnings takes place over time, and suggesting that it results from
marriage itself). There are a host of possible factors that could affect both marriageability and earning
potential, thus confounding the analysis-for example, social skills, intelligence, and attractive personal
appearance could all have a positive effect on both male earnings and male marriageability.
41
For an estimate of the market value of nonearner married mothers, see Stay-at-Home Mother's
Work Worth $138,095 a Year, REUTERS, May 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/
idUSN0236053520070502?src=050207_I 719_ARTICLE_PROMO_also_on_reuters [hereinafter Stayat-Home Mother's Work] ("If the typical stay-at-home mother in the United States were paid for her
work ... she would earn $138,095 a year .... The 10 jobs listed as comprising a mother's work were
housekeeper, cook, day care center teacher, laundry machine operator, van driver, facilities manager,
janitor, computer operator, chief executive officer and psychologist.").
42
See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian
Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REv. 509, 520 n.l8 (1998) (describing studies showing that women in dual-earner
couples do more domestic work); Stay-at-Home Mother's Work, supra note 41 ("A mother who holds
full-time job [sic] outside the home would earn an additional $85,939 for the work she does at home.");
see also Silbaugh, supra note 38, at 118-19 (discussing divorce courts' failures to account for home
work by women in dual-earner households).
43
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. c. ("The spousal contribution of domestic labor may
not confer an equal financial benefit, but may have made it possible for the couple to raise children as
well as accumulate property. One spouse may have contributed more than the other in emotional stability, optimism, or social skills, and thereby enriched the marital life. Property may be the only thing left
at dissolution for the court to divide, but it is not usually the only thing produced during the marriage.
An equal allocation of the property at divorce might thus be grounded on a presumption that both
spouses contributed significantly to the entire relationship whether or not they contributed equally to accumulation of property during it.").
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ity in marriage. 44 Thus, while the fifty-fifty rule may overcompensate or
undercompensate spouses in different scenarios, 45 faced with the difficulties
in measuring true contribution, equal division functions as an appealing default,46 reflecting and reinforcing the ideal of equality in marriage. 47
Disagreements regarding how contributions should be measured notwithstanding, the partnership theory, broadly conceived, treats marital earnings as subject to division in order to ensure that both spouses are
compensated for their labor. Breadwinners and homemakers are thus entitled to a portion of marital property because they have earned it.

B. The Separate Property Rule
Because property acquired prior to marriage and gifts and bequests received during marriage do not result from the fruits of spouses' labor during
the marriage, partnership theory classifies them as external to the marriage.
Preexisting property cannot possibly be conceived as a product of the joint
marital endeavor and therefore assigning any part of it to the marriage
would bestow a windfall on a nonowner spouse who contributed nothing to
its acquisition. Gifts and bequests given to one of the spouses are by definition gratuitous rather than compensatory and do not therefore belong to the
marriage as joint venture, but rather to the donee spouse individually. 48
Gifts and bequests are also separate out of respect for donors' intentions, 49

44

See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law
and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 396-97 (noting that the use of the partnership business metaphor
has led to a more egalitarian reconstruction of marriage and family); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage
Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 109-10 (1998) (arguing that monetary and
nonmonetary contributions to marriage should be treated equally because wages and housework "are
both expressions of affection as well as materially beneficial"); Singer, supra note 12, at 1114 (finding
the investment partnership theory of marriage promising for achieving more equal and equitable results
for women because it entitles women to an equal share of the fruits of the marriage).
45 Some commentators have complained that equal division has not translated into equal results,
leaving women and their children with less than they deserve. See Singer, supra note 12, at 1113-14.
46 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. c ("[T]he incommensurability of the spouses' nonfinancial contributions frustrates any effort to attach monetary value to them. Faced with this measurement difficulty, it may be sensible for the law to presume irrebuttably that the spouses contributed
equally to their entire relationship.").
47 On equal division's "expressive function," see Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 97.
48 Such gifts may also be considered "lucrative" rather than "onerous." DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 17, § 62. Onerous title refers to property acquired through a spouse's labor, industry, or other
valuable consideration, such as money, services, performance of conditions, etc. Onerous title property
is always community property. This reflects the concept that property acquired through the efforts or
labor of a marital partner belongs to the marital partnership. Lucrative title, on the other hand, is property acquired by gift, inheritance, or intestate succession. The donor's intention controls the classification of property acquired by lucrative title. If the donor intends for both spouses to benefit from the gift,
it is community property. Otherwise, the property remains separate. Id.
49 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 117.
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particularly the common interest to keep property within one family's
bloodline. 50
The treatment of income from and appreciation of separate property is
a source of much angst and debate as jurisdictional rules vary dramatically
and some are too murky and untested to produce predictable results. 51 That
said, many states focus on whether gains from separate property can be attributed to the active labor, skill, or industry of either spouse. If so, they are
likely to be deemed marital. If not-if the spouses were passive-the accrued gains are likely to remain separate. 52
III. RECONSIDERING THE SANCTITY OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
A closer examination of the current classification system reveals that
the labor-centered rule is inherently problematic. This Part first turns to the
theoretical inconsistencies of the prevailing paradigm. The Part then shows
that in practice, deviations from the partnership principle abound. These
deviations reveal a latent ambivalence toward the principle itself and confirm that it is both indefensible and unworkable.

A. Theoretical Inconsistencies
The most fundamental flaw of the partnership theory is its presumption
that all spouses are equally invested in the marriage as an economic joint
venture. 53 But assuming that spouses with widely divergent extramarital
wealth will be equally motivated to pursue remunerative work ignores human nature. Most people work for pay because they want the security and
the freedom that money can buy. While some independently wealthy individuals translate their educational and other advantages into more wealth,

°

5

For a historical account of the relationship between marriage and inheritance, see Gary, supra
note I, at 571 ("Prior to this century, inheritance between spouses in Western Europe and the United
States was rare. As Mary Ann Glendon explains, '(m]arriage was not seen as a reason for shifting family wealth, especially land, from one blood line to another."' (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 239 (1989))).
51
See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.04 reporter's notes cmt. a ("All community-property states
agree that the increased value of separate property that results from marital labor is community property,
while any 'natural increase' in the value of separate property remains separate. Even within a single
state, however, inconsistent methods are used for the allocation of appreciation between these two classifications."); see also infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
52
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.04 cmt. c (explaining that the rule that income from and
appreciation of separate property are marital to the extent they are attributable to either spouse's labor
"has long been followed in community-property states and is increasingly the rule in the common-law
states"). But see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
53
As a legal matter, spouses are formally obligated to act in good faith with respect to marital property. See, e.g., UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT§ 2(a), 9 U.L.A. 114 (1983) ("Each spouse shall act in good
faith with respect to the other spouse in matters involving marital property or other property of the other
spouse. This obligation may not be varied by a marital property agreement."). Spouses may be sanctioned if they fail to act in good faith. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.10. These requirements,
however, have no impact on the professional choices spouses make.
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others are lulled-or crippled-by their inheritances into barely working at
all. 54 Even the hard-working wealthy are incentivized to be less risk averse
than those without a safety net and to pour their energy into ventures that
promise less steady and secure compensation than they might otherwise
pursue.
The partnership theory's labor-centered rule also presents line-drawing
difficulties. The theory requires that all fruits of both spouses' labor belong
to the couple as a unit; excluding gifts and inheritances from the marital pot
defeats this principle. Pure gifts-gifts that are wholly motivated by altruism-are rare. In fact, most "gifts" involve some expectation, however
slight, of future reward or the satisfaction of an outstanding debt; they result
from luck and from labor. 55 For instance, a spouse who receives a large inheritance from an aged parent thirty years into marriage may be receiving
what is in substance compensation for years of caretaking. The injustice of
classifying this "delayed compensation" as separate property would be especially stark where the donee spouse left a paying job to care for the parent. Though community property doctrine has tried to grapple with this

54

See ANDREW CARNEGIE, The Advantages of Poverty, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 50, 56 (Edward
C. Kirkland ed., 1962); Richard I. Kirkland, Jr., Should You Leave It All to the Children?, FORTUNE,
Sept. 29, 1986, at 18; Posting of Mark Kleiman to The Reality-Based Community, http://
www .samefacts.com/archives/microeconomics_and_policy_analysis _/2005/04/protecting_heirs_from_
uneamed_wealth_and_sloth.php (Apr. 17, 2005, 12:38 PST) ("People who have accumulated wealth
rarely understand how much they damage their children by setting tht;m up so they don't need to do anything.").
These noneamers are often the daughters of wealthy couples. See THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM
D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR 182 (1996) ("Daughters of wealthy couples tend not to have
careers of their own ... [and] housewives have the highest propensity of all major occupational groups
to receive inheritances as well as periodic financial gifts from their parents . . . . In fact, housewives are
three times more likely to receive substantial inheritances from their parents than are adult children of
the affiuent on average.").
55
See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES
14 (W.O. Halls trans., W.W. Norton 1990) (1950) ("[E]verything-food, women, children, property,
talismans, land, labour services, priestly functions, and ranks-is there for passing on, and for balancing
accounts."); Mary Douglas, Foreword to MAUSS, supra, at vii, ix ('There are no free gifts; gift cycles
engage persons in permanent commitments that articulate the dominant institutions."); Frantz & Dagan,
supra note 10, at 117-18 ("In many contexts, gift exchange is implicitly reciprocal-gifts are given as
payback for favors granted or in anticipation of favorable future treatment. Inheritances, too, may be
shaped by labor-related factors, such as one child's willingness to care for her parents in their old age.");
C.A. Gregory, Gifts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 524, 524 (John Eatwell
et al. eds., 1987) ("Anthropologists stress that while gifts appear to be voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, they are in fact obligatory and interested."); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REv. 491, 497 (2005) ("Anthropologists have discovered that many economic
assets are exchanged between intimates in the form of gifts. This practice of gift exchange, though, involves at least implicit bargaining and self-interest in addition to altruism. Most gifts are given under
some degree of social compulsion and with the expectation of receiving something of equivalent or
greater value in return. The reciprocation of gifts-whether in the form of material goods and services
or social rewards, such as higher social status-is virtually obligatory as a matter of social practice.").
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line-drawing difficulty, 56 most gifts and bequests remain presumptively
separate, and inquiries into unspoken exchange expectations surrounding
wealth transfer, especially within families, are rare.
A similar line-drawing difficulty applies to the proper classification of
marital earnings. Earned wealth is hardly ever the result of labor alone; it is
almost always attributable in part to pure luck. Most professional achievements depend on any number of factors predating marriage: gender, race,
nationality, genetic talents, education, cultural fluency, childhood upbringing, previous employment experiences, and connections. The currency that
greases the wheels of professional success may also come in the form of favors that are essentially "gifts"-some of which may be received during
marriage. Examples include the friend of the family who gives someone
her first job, the former roommate who reveals the inside scoop before a
critical interview, and the mentor who pushes someone's application into
the right pile. The partnership theory does not-indeed, cannot-decouple
these gift-like aspects from property derived from labor.
On the flip side, marital earnings alone may under-represent the true
accumulation during the marriage, as is the case where one spouse, often
the wife, forgoes career opportunities so that the husband can maximize his.
In such instances, the most valuable asset generated during marriage may be
the husband's enhanced earning capacity. Since this earning capacity will
continue to bear fruit after the marriage ends, many commentators believe it
should be accounted for at divorce. 57
A pure (but administratively unworkable) application of the laborcentered rule would recharacterize those portions of gifts that are attributable to effort as marital property and those portions of earnings attributable
to unearned privilege as separate property. It might also impose a type of
"endowment tax" on born-rich dilettantes-requiring them to make up for
their lack of earnings based on a gauge of their unused earning capacityand add career assets acquired in the course of marriage to the marital property pot.
56

See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 157--60 (discussing the classification of remunera-

tory gifts).
57

Some commentators-but only one jurisdiction (New York}-have recognized that the current
cutoff date for earnings attributable to the marriage does not accurately reflect the true accumulation of
wealth from the marriage. Not only do professional degrees acquired during marriage often represent a
joint investment by the parties, but as a conceptual matter, a much broader category of earnings projected to materialize after divorce may have accrued during the marriage-e.g., developing a patent,
composing a symphony, training for the Olympics, starting a business. For discussions of the proper
treatment of"career assets," i.e., enhancements to spouses' careers that occur during-and often by virtue of-marriage, see Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and
Middle Class, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93 ( 1997); Singer, supra note 12; Jana Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 FAM. L.Q. 119 ( 1997); Brett R. Turner, Goodwill and Spousal
Support, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J., June 2005, at 61; Brett R. Turner, Why New York May Be Mov-

ing Away from Treating Professional Degrees as Marital Property (and Why Attorneys in Other States
Should Care), DIVORCE LITIG., July 2004, at 128.
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In addition to these line-drawing difficulties, a faithful application of
the retroactive contract approach (designing divorce law based on an approximation of what the parties would have negotiated in advance) would
likely demand that a portion of preexisting, gifted, and devised property be
classified as maritat5 8 Note also that most states' intestate succession
schemes leave a significant portion of all of the decedent's estate to the surviving spouse without regard to how or when it was acquired. 59 These
schemes reflect legislatures' presumption that most people would leave at
least some of their separate property to their spouse had they executed a
will. 60
Finally, once the classification process is complete, the two existing
approaches to the division of marital property are also problematic. Caseby-case estimations of relative contribution and need are highly subjective,
tend to undervalue women's nonmonetary contributions, and produce much
uncertainty. Equal division, on the other hand, is too blunt an instrument if
the goal is to allocate the fruits of each spouse's labor according to his or
her "true" contribution. In the case of spouses who contribute unequal
amounts of labor to the marriage, the equal division rule gives lesser contributing spouses a free lunch. The equal division rule is especially unfair
from a labor-centered perspective where both spouses earn significantly different amounts and there are no children. It also misses its mark where both
spouses earn comparable amounts and where one spouse also shoulders
most of the housework and childrearing. In such cases, equal division undercompensates the primary caregiver, who effectively holds two jobs. 61

B. Deviations in Practice
Given these theoretical inconsistencies, it should come as no surprise
that in practice, the application of the labor-centered principle is anything
but straightforward. A number of doctrines and trends indicate that in fact,
some separate property is often included in the pot of money subject to division at divorce. Thomas Oldham has criticized the liberal use of some of
58
Lifshitz, supra note 26, at 729-30 (suggesting that nonpropertied spouses often rely on their partners' premarital and unearned wealth); see also infra Part Ill. C.
59
Gary, supra note I, at 572-73 ("In a 1978 survey, a majority of respondents stated they would
give all their property to their spouse, even if they were survived by children of the marriage, parents, or
siblings. Intestacy statutes, which purport to dispose of a decedent's property in the manner desired by
most people, increasingly give the surviving spouse either a substantial share or all of the decedent's estate. Thus, inheritance by a surviving spouse of all of the decedent spouse's property, either by will or
by intestacy, is common.").
60
See JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 62, 65 (2d ed. 2003) ("Many legislators and
scholars have concluded that the intestate succession statute should aim to give effect to the probable
intent of the decedent . . . . [W]hen testators write wills, they typically leave all or most of their estates
to their spouses . . . . So, legislators assume, decedents who don't write wills would also want their
spouses to take the bulk of their estates.").
61
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing judicial discretion to deviate from equal division).
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these doctrines for "undercut[ting] the marital property system."62 But in
light of the inconsistencies discussed above, the deviations from the principle may be better understood as safety valves through which the system lets
off the steam generated by the internal tension of an incoherent paradigm. 63
For example, many states begin the classification process with a presumption that all property owned by either spouse at divorce is marital
property. The burden is on the separate property holder to prove that the
property in question did not result from labor performed during the marriage, but rather is traceable to separate property. 64 Many states recognize
the transmutation of separate property into marital property where separate
and marital funds have been commingled,65 and a few states allow for
transmutation where separate property was used by both parties ("transmutation by use" 66 or "transmutation by implied agreement"67 ), especially in
cases in which the spouses' marital home was acquired with separate
funds. 68 Though no state has adopted the ALI's recommendation for a
bright-line rule transmuting an increasing percentage of separate property
into marital property based on the length of the marriage, 69 several states do
take the length of the marriage into account at the margins of existing doctrines.70 Lottery winnings, the ultimate luck-generated property, are generally classified as marital/' though not necessarily if they can be attributed to
a winning ticket purchased with separate funds. 72
62
63

Oldham, supra note I, at 248.
See id. at 248--49 ("[Some courts] seem more inclined to find a spouse's intent to make a gift of
separate property to the marital estate, more willing to find a commingled account uncommingleable,
and more disposed to discovering an intention to transmute separate property to marital property. What
can explain this? These courts may question the fairness of the marital property system. A court can
significantly expand the scope of the divisible marital estate by creative use of the notions of commingling and transmutation." (emphasis added)).
64
See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.03[1]; Oldham, supra note I, at 222.
65 See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.03; Oldham, supra note I, at 221-33, 247--48.
66 See Oldham, supra note I, at 246-47.
67 See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.02[2].
68 See id. § 11.02[2] n.l8; Brett R. Turner, Marital Home Update, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J.,
Apr. 2005, at 37 (noting a series of cases that recognize that the marital home is not always property of
the marriage, but considering the circumstances under which the home can be transmuted into marital
property); Brett R. Turner, Unlikely Partners: The Marital Home and the Concept of Separate Property,
20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 69 (2006).
69 See infra Part Ili.C.
70 See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.03 ("Courts sometimes reimburse the spouse's separate property that was commingled if the parties divorce after a short marriage.").
71
See, e.g., Ware v. Ware, 748 A.2d 1031, 1041 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (finding that various
bank and brokerage accounts held solely in the husband's name were marital property because the assets
were purchased with lottery winnings); Damon v. Damon, 823 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006) (holding that proceeds from a winning lottery ticket acquired during marriage constituted marital
property); Campbell v. Campbell, 213 A.D.2d 1027, 1027 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("Courts have universally held that the proceeds of a winning lottery ticket acquired by a spouse during the marriage constitute marital property." (citations omitted)); Parker v. Parker, 766 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
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As mentioned above, many states classify income from and appreciation of separate property as marital only to the extent they are attributable to
either spouse's labor. This approach requires that gains from separate property be allocated into two parts-one part attributable to labor and another
attributable to the separate capital's "natural" growth, with only the former
part becoming marital property. But, as the ALI Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution explain, allocations of this sort are inherently difficult
and states that follow this labor-centered rule "have been inconsistent in
both their choice and application of the allocation method." 73 Other states'
treatment of gains from separate property, however, deviates from the labor-centered principle. Some treat all income from separate property as
marital/ 4 attributing to the marriage property that may be the result of luck,
and creating an artificial incentive to invest in non-income-producing assets.75 Others rule that enhancements to the value of separate property are
not marital if they were generated by the spouse who owns the separate
2003) ("The Jaw is well settled that a lottery prize won during a marriage is generally considered property acquired during the marriage subject to equitable distribution." (citations omitted)); Thomas v.
Thomas, 579 S.E.2d 310, 311 n.3 (S.C. 2003) (noting that the lower court correctly found the lottery
winnings to be marital property).
72
Most sources dealing with the classification of lottery proceeds refer to cases in which the winning ticket was purchased out of marital funds. Authority on windfalls traceable to separate property is
sparse, but cases and secondary sources imply that they would be classified as separate. See In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N.E.2d 1300, 1301 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding as most significant the undisputed evidence that the money used to purchase the winning ticket came from marital earnings and the
right to receive payments became irrevocable during marriage); OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 5.03[6] ("If
the spouse wins the lottery during marriage by purchasing a lottery ticket with marital funds, the proceeds ... should be marital."). But see Dixon v. Sanderson, 10 S.W. 535, 536 (Tex. 1888) (holding that
lottery proceeds from a winning ticket the wife purchased with her separate property were community
property because the prize "came as the fortuitous result of a contract based on valuable consideration
paid, and is but the profit on a venture, which like other profit, not resulting from the increased value of
a thing bought with the separate means of one party to the marital union, becomes the common property
of the husband and wife"). See generally Katie Foster, Comment, Dividing Lottery Winnings During
Dissolution of Marriage, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 357 (2003) (explaining how a state's property regime (community or separate), timing of winning and disbursements, and other factors affect the
divisibility of lottery winnings at divorce); Amy P. Bunk, Annotation, Division of Lottery Proceeds in
Divorce Proceedings, 124 A.L.R.5th 537 (2004).
73 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.05 reporter's notes cmt.b. The ALI describes the two methods
as follows: "One method, akin to a quantum meruit approach, values the labor input by reference to prevailing compensation rates, and attributes all remaining gain to capital. The other method values the
capital input by reference to ordinary rates of return, and attributes all the remaining gain to labor." !d.
§ 4.05 cmt. b. Both methods, however, often produce arbitrary results. See id. § 4.05 cmt. b, at 669-70,
reporter's notes cmt. b, at 681.
74
See id. § 4.04 cmt. a ("Most community-property states follow the 'American rule' under which
both income and appreciation retain the separate-property character of the underlying asset, but a minority follow some version of the 'Spanish rule' under which the income is community. The common-Jaw
states are more difficult to classify because their Jaw on this question is not as well developed, but [as a]
general pattern, ... many, if not most, follow the 'American rule."').
75
This incentive may ultimately be detrimental to both parties if the investments fail to maximize
the profits from the property.
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property, thus excluding from the marital pot property that, according to the
partnership logic, should be included in it. 76 The treatment of income from
and appreciation of separate property is thus especially illustrative of the
law's half-hearted embrace of the labor-centered paradigm.
Once the classification process is complete, some equitable distribution
statutes specifically direct judges to take separate property into account in
the division of marital property. 77 Some statutes allow courts to consider78
depletion of separate property for marital purposes. 79 Additionally, as we
have seen, while some states direct judges to take contribution into account
at the distribution stage, others dilute this principle with other factors or reject it altogether by imposing an equal division rule. In one divorce case,
for example, a self-made multibillionaire argued that his wife should not be
entitled to half of the fortune he accumulated during their twenty-eight year
marriage because it was attributable not only to his efforts but primarily to
his "genius." Implicitly, he was arguing that a large part of his earnings
were the result of an attribute inherent to him that he had possessed from
birth-the ultimate luck-generated property. The court ruled that the husband's earnings were marital property and divided them equally between
76

See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.04 reporter's notes cmt. c ("While the principle of a community of labor is central to the community-property system, its reception in the common-law states has
been uneasy, even after decades of equitable-distribution reforms. Section 14 of the Uniform Marital
Property Act provides a recent example. This section establishes a marital-property interest in separate
capital when the capital's value is enhanced by the labor of the other spouse, but not where the value is
enhanced by the labor of the spouse who owns the separate capital. The language of both the section
and its commentary suggest the drafters' view that one spouse must provide a substantial labor input in
order to 'earn' a share in the appreciation of the other's separate capital; the labor of the spousal owner
of the separate property creates no similar entitlement by his spouse. It is thus apparent that while
UMPA follows many community-property principles and is often described as a community-property
law, as to marital labors it adopts a conception that departs from the fundamental community-property
view that marriage assumes a commitment of all one's labors to the benefit of the marital community.").
For further discussion of the difficulty in allocating increases in the value of separate property according
to spouses' labor, see David Westfall, Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The American Law Institute's
Recommendations for Spousal Support and Division of Property, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 176,
188-89 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
77
See MICHAEL ASIMOW ET AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY§ 19.09
(2007) ("[S]ome jurisdictions specifically direct that the court consider as a factor in making equitable
distribution the value of any separate property set apart to the parties."); FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 16, § 37.06; OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 13.02[1]; Shapo, supra note 21, at 712-13 ("Several
community property states ... permit equitable division of community property at divorce if one spouse
would suffer economic hardship because of unusual circumstances, or if there are 'compelling reasons'
to do so, and almost all also permit payments for support.").
78
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.10.
79
ASIMOW ET AL., supra note 77, § 19.09 n.3; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1)(d) (2007)
(providing that a court may consider as a factor depletion of separate property for marital purposes); see
also Hayes v. Hayes, 792 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that the fact that a spouse's
separate property was contributed to the acquisition of marital property or used for marital living expenses was a permissible factor to consider in dividing property); Zacharek v. Zacharek, 498 N.Y.S.2d
625,626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
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the spouses. 80 Additionally, some "hybrid" states follow the general rule
that only marital funds are subject to distribution, but permit the invasion of
separate funds where severe hardship would otherwise result. 81
Outside of the divorce context, some jurisdictions' spousal disinheritance laws blatantly contradict the labor-centered principle. Community
property states maintain the distinction between community and separate
property at death; surviving spouses are entitled to fifty percent of the property accumulated through labor during the marriage, and deceased spouses'
estates include the remaining fifty percent, not more. 82 But in some noncommunity property states 83 and under the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 84
the property subject to the elective share or "forced share"-the property
reachable by a disinherited spouse-includes all of the testator's property.
In these states, disinherited surviving spouses may, depending on the circumstances, receive more by electing against a will than they would at divorce under labor-centered partnership principles. On the other hand, in
some cases surviving spouses may be left with less than they "deserve" under partnership principles--e.g., where the survivor is entitled to less than
one-half of the decedent's estate and where this entire estate is composed of
80

deCastro v. deCastro, 616 N.E.2d 52, 56 (Mass. 1993).
See Oldham, supra note I, at 219.
82
See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 9798 (1994) ("Because equal ownership of all community property is recognized prior to the death of either spouse, the need for a forced or elective share is eliminated. The survivor retains her separate property and her one-half interest in the community property, while the decedent's separate property and his
one-half interest in the community property pass pursuant to his will or through intestacy.").
83
See, e.g., Harriet Newman Cohen, To Have or Have Not (A Prenuptial Agreement), N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 7, 2006, at 9, 12 (2006) ("[In New York, u]nlike divorce law, estate law does not distinguish between separate and marital property. Therefore, unless a prenuptial agreement provides otherwise, a
surviving spouse will inherit not only 'marital' property, but 'separate' property as well. This is also
true in more seasoned marriages when 'marital' property is insufficient to satisfy the elective share.");
Gary, supra note I, at 592-93 (1995) ("[T]he Delaware [elective share] statute is based solely on the
decedent's estate. There is no attempt to base the elective share on marital property, no attempt to include marital property held in the surviving spouse's name, and no attempt to exclude the decedent's
separate property.").
84
UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2-203, 8 U.L.A. 103-04 (amended 1993). Note however that the UPC's
scheme, while not technically faithful to the partnership theory, was aimed at allocating to the surviving
spouse only labor-generated property. See id. at art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt., 8 U.L.A. 93, 95 ("The redesigned elective share is intended to bring elective share law into line with the partnership theory of marriage."). The drafters conceded that a community property model was theoretically ideal, but they
decided it was unworkable because of tracing problems. They also rejected a discretionary equitable
distribution-style scheme as inappropriate because the deceased spouse would not be present to protect
her interests and because of its unpredictable nature. Instead, the UPC drafters devised an "accrualtype" elective share. The surviving spouse would be entitled to a gradually increasing percentage of the
augmented estate which would include all of the testator's property, starting from zero after one year
and increasing to fifty percent after fifteen years of the marriage. Because the augmented estate includes
both marital and separate property, the scheme aims to approximate a partnership-type result by presuming that the portion of the augmented estate attributable to joint efforts will grow over the course of the
marriage. See Waggoner, supra note 21; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and
Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 7610WA L. REV. 223 (1991).
81
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property earned in the course of the marriage. 85 Thus, commentators who
support the labor-centered paradigm complain that schemes like the UPC's
"fail ... to apply the marital partnership theory."86
C. Existing Proposals

Despite these tensions, most authorities hold fast to the labor-centered
partnership concept. Recently, however, scholars Carolyn Frantz and
Hanoch Dagan have offered an alternative, explicitly arguing that "labor
should not be the standard for inclusion in the marital estate."87 Instead,
they suggest a temporal standard for inclusion of some separate property in
the marital pot. A similar scheme, which itself informed Frantz and Dagan's, can be found in section 4.12 of the ALI Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution. 88
The ALI and the Frantz-Dagan models recharacterize a gradually increasing percentage of preexisting property as marital based on the length
of the marriage. In the case of gifts and inheritances received during marriage, the ALI and Frantz and Dagan diverge. The ALI recommends that
the duration of the marriage as well as the time since the property's receipt-the "holding period"-determine the recharacterized percentage. 89
This ensures, for example, that even in long-term marriages, property inherited on the eve of divorce will remain separate. Frantz and Dagan, by contrast, believe that gifts and inheritances received during marriage should be
classified as marital based not only on the length of the marriage, but also
on the duration of the relationship between the donor and donee, regardless
of how long the gift has been held. Under their scheme, each gift or inheri85
See Rosenbury, supra note I (surveying differences between state defaults regarding distribution
of property at divorce and protections against spousal disinheritance); Waggoner, supra note 21, at 4849 (illustrating cases in which the traditional elective share overcompensates and undercompensates the
surviving spouses as compared with the fifty-fifty partnership principle).
86
Gary, supra note I, at 589 ("The drafters of the 1990 UPC sought to use the fifteen-year phase-in
provision to confront the problem of including nonmarital property in the augmented estate. Although
the phase-in may help in some cases, the arbitrary nature of the formula fails to solve the problem. Under many scenarios, the resulting elective share amount will not equal one-half of the marital property.
For example, property owned by spouses married five years could be entirely marital property. On the
· other hand, property could be substantially separate if it was owned by spouses who began a fifteen-year
marriage after or near retirement. Another way in which the 1990 UPC fails to apply the marital partnership theory is in its treatment of an independently wealthy surviving spouse. The ... approach of the
UPC means that separate assets of both spouses are included in the estate to which the elective share
percentage is applied. Separate assets of the surviving spouse are then charged against that spouse's
elective share amount. The result is that a spouse who has contributed a lifetime of energy and work in
amassing a couple's marital estate may be denied any part of that property if the value of that spouse's
independent wealth is greater than that of the marital estate."); see also Charles H. Whitebread, The Uniform Probate Code's Nod to the Partnership Theory of Marriage: The 1990 Elective Share Revisions,
II PROB. L.J. 125 (1992).
87
88

89

Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 117.
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12.
Jd. § 4.12(2).
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tance would be multiplied by the ratio that the length of the marriage bears
to the relationship between the donor and donee. The result is the amount
that is deemed marital property. Thus, for example, "[i]n the case of a gift
from a parent to a child who is fifty-two years old, and who has been married eight years, 8/52 (or 2113) of the gift's value should be marital property."90 This formula is designed to determine the "extent to which a gift
reflects a relationship cultivated during marriage."91 The remaining eleventhirteenths in the same example would be separate because they are attributable to a relationship cultivated before the marriage.
Both the ALI and Frantz and Dagan justify a standard centered on
length of marriage by reference to spouses' likely intent and expectations.
The ALI reporters explain:
[An underlying premise of the rule] is that a spousal sense that property is
communally rather than individually owned has its source in the relationship
of the parties, and marital duration provides an administrable measure of that
relationship that can be used absent special circumstances. The more intertwined the spouses lives have become, the more readily they will expect to
share one another's good or bad fortune .... A sense of communal ownership
will develop more rapidly for separate assets received in the 25th year of marriage than in the fifth. 92

In Frantz and Dagan's words:
[Transmutation of separate property] reflects the reality of marriage-many
spouses do in fact intend to give some of their separate property to the community while it exists. This is due, we think, to two phenomena: the moral
imperative to share all one has with a loved one in financial need (for instance,
a spouse who refuses to pay for the costs of a medical crisis out of separate
property has failed in the duties of love), and the fact that, over time, spouses
feel less need and less desire to guard against the possibility of divorce and
remarriage. For the latter reason, we agree with the ALI ... that the length of
the marriage is in general a good proxy for intent to transmute separate property.93

Because both proposals are rooted in the parties' presumed intent and expectations, both allow property owners to opt out of the rule. 94 At the same

° Frantz & Dagan, supra note I0, at 118 n.l95.

9

91

!d. at 118; see also id. at 117-18 ("Gifts and inheritances reflect marital good fortune or labor
performed during marriage, but they do so only partially. Both the luck and the labor may precede the
marriage. This is particularly true of gifts or inheritances from family members who have had lifelong
relationships with the donee far exceeding the length of the marriage.").
92
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12 cmt. b, at 772; see also id. § 4.12 cmt. a, at 771; id. § 4.12
reporter's notes cmt. a, at 781-82.
93 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 114-15.
94 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12 cmt. a ("[The effect of the rule] is to establish that spouses
who live together for many years commit at least some of their resources to one another, in a proportion
that increases with the duration of their relationship, unless there is good reason to think that they did
not intend that result." (emphasis added)); Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 115 ("Of course, spouses
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time, Frantz and Dagan retain the doctrine of transmutation by use. 95 Thus,
even where a propertied spouse has explicitly communicated that he or she
does not intend to transmute separate property, if it was used by both
spouses during marriage-such as with a marital home-such property is
classified as entirely marital, with the original owner having a right of first
purchase. The ALI is silent on transmutation by use. Thus, where a valid
opt-out exists and the parties share separate property, the property would
likely retain its separate character. 96
While these approaches improve upon a blanket exclusion of unearned
and premarital property from the marital pot, and while they correctly focus
on the duration of the marriage as one of the keys to a more rational paradigm, they are incomplete. The suggestion that separate property be recharacterized as marital based on the length of the marriage relies on an
assumption that as marriages last longer, spouses' expectations that their
union should translate into a merger of financial interests grow stronger.
While this may be so, the precise relationship between marriage duration
and sharing expectations will vary from one couple to the next, as well as
within each marital unit. 97 It is therefore unsurprising that the ALI and
Frantz and Dagan include only a rough· suggestion regarding how the
gradually increasing percentage should be set. 98 Ultimately, the formula can

should be allowed to easily and unilaterally opt out of this default rule."). The ALI allows unilateral
opt-out only with respect to gifts and inheritances received during marriage. For premarital assets to
remain separate, both parties must enter a premarital agreement. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2,
§ 4.12 cmt. c, at 776-77. That said, section 4.12(6) preserves the separate property owner's interests if
"necessary to avoid substantial injustice." This provision, in combination with the italicized language
above, implies that unilateral opt-out might be respected were the rules put into effect. See also Lifshitz,
supra note 26, at 734 (suggesting that spouses with premarital or unearned assets should bear the burden
of notifYing their partner of their intention to keep such property separate and that absent such notification, the nonpropertied spouse may be entitled to "reliance damages").
95
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10 at 116 ("[T]here is one circumstance where property should be
transmuted regardless of intent-when items are used during marriage.").
96
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12.
97
The ALI's reporter's notes themselves acknowledge the tenuous basis for the ALI's proposed approach. See id. § 4.12 reporter's notes cmt. a ("Data on what spouses actually expect in their marriage
are sparse, so this section necessarily rests on assumptions about those expectations. Of course, assumptions are required regardless of how the issue addressed by this section is resolved. . . . The data suggest
that economic decisions made during marriage are largely premised on the assumption that the marriage
will continue, which is a premise of this section. Another premise of this section, that after 30 or 35
years of marriage most people will expect that property their spouses brought into the marriage will be
available to them jointly upon retirement or in an emergency, remains untested. However, the courts of
hotchpot states may share this assumption, for they appear more likely to allocate inherited or premarital
property to the other spouse at the dissolution of a lengthy marriage than at the dissolution of a short
one." (citations omitted)).
98
The only parameter offered by the ALI concerning premarital property is that the recharacterized
portion increases over time from zero in the case of short (two- or three-year) marriages to one hundred
percent in the case of thirty- to thirty-five-year marriages. /d. § 4.12 cmt. b, at 773. The recharacterization of gifts and inheritances received during marriage is addressed in section 4.12(2), which provides:
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only match expectations if it is determined on a case-by-case basis. How
long must a marriage last for twenty-five percent of premarital property to
belong to the couple? A standard scheme is bound to seem arbitrary from
within a given relationship.
Frantz and Dagan's suggestion that a portion of gifts and devises
should be classified as marital based on the length of the marriage and the
length of the donor-donee relationship is also problematic. If, as they
claim, the classification of premarital property should be based on length of
marriage regardless of how the property was acquired, why should gifts and
inheritances received during marriage be treated differently? Why, for example, should a spouse who inherits $1 million one day before the wedding
have to contribute a different amount to the marital pot than a spouse who
receives the same amount one day after the wedding? Why should a spouse
who receives a gift from a lifelong friend have to contribute less than one
who receives the same amount from a recently "cultivated" relationship?
Donor intent cannot explain the difference because preexisting property-to
which Frantz and Dagan apply the length-of-marriage formula-may also
include gifts and inheritances. Additionally, Frantz and Dagan themselves
acknowledge that donor intent should not be dispositive in the classification
of gifts as marital or separate. 99 They explicitly reject the labor-centered
classification standard and argue that gifts reflect luck as well as labor, yet
their classification of gifts and inheritances as marital only to the extent
they "reflect[] a relationship cultivated during marriage" 100 echoes the old
paradigm that they purportedly reject. A gift or inheritance that is truly
viewed by all parties-donor, donee, and donee's spouse-as external to
the marriage should be designated as such through explicit agreement. The
default rule, if Frantz and Dagan's own principles are followed, should
classify property based on its prospective meaning to the spouses, not on its
source.
In sum, both the ALI's and Frantz and Dagan's proposals attribute to
the marriage a portion of property currently classified as separate, but neither method provides a concrete answer to the question of how much premarital or unearned wealth should be shared in marriage. 101 Length of the
A portion of separate property acquired by each spouse during marriage should be recharacterized at dissolution as marital property if, at the time of dissolution, both the marital duration, and
the time since the property's acquisition (the "holding period"), exceed the minimum length specified for each in a rule of statewide application.
(a) The percentage of separate property that is recharacterized as marital property under Paragraph (2) should be determined by a formula, specified in a rule of statewide application, that
takes into account both the marital duration and the holding period of the property in question.
(b) The formula should specify a marital duration and holding period at which the full value of
the property is recharacterized at dissolution as marital property.

/d. § 4.12(2).
99
See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 117; see also infra Part IV.
10
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 118.
101
For a further critique of section 4.12 of the ALI Principles, see Westfall, supra note 76, at 95658.

°
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marriage and holding period on their own do not translate into a nonarbitrary recharacterization amount. Moreover, looking to the length of the donor-donee relationship takes a step backwards, returning to the flawed
labor-centered paradigm.
IV. BEYOND THE LABOR-CENTERED PARADIGM
As we have seen, the current marital property classification system is
neither sound in theory nor followed strictly in practice. But while transmutation and other doctrines mean that the labor-centered rule is followed
only partially, they result in tremendous uncertainty regarding the likely
outcome of any given divorce. The discretionary application of many of
these deviations also creates the impression that divorce decisions are arbitrary and unfair. Some doctrines also create an incentive for spouses to
keep property separate and to share as little as possible unless they are prepared to allow the entire property in question to be characterized as marital.
The "excuses" for attributing separate property to the marriage employed by
the doctrinal deviations seem like just that-excuses for overriding a seemingly sacred principle. The problem is the principle itself.

A. Marriage as Merger ofRisk and Reward
I. The Risk and Reward Paradigm.-Fortunately, the kernels of a
more coherent recharacterization approach are contained in two aspects of
Frantz and Dagan's overarching theory of marriage to which they give short
shrift in their discussion of preexisting, gifted, and inherited property. First,
they argue that one of the unique and essential characteristics of marriage is
its communal dimension. Specifically, marriage fuses spouses' interests
such that "what is good for one spouse must affect what is good for the
other." 102 "[S]pouses," the authors explain, "perceive themselves at least
partially as a 'we,' a plural subject, that is in turn a constitutive feature of
each spouse's identity as an 'I. "' 103 Central to this view of the communal
aspect of marriage is the notion that "sharing life and its projects requires
spouses to pool their efforts and their rewards, 'each operating on joint behalf of both. "' 104 Spouses do not view collective benefits such as pooling of
resources and economies of scale in a mercenary way as individuals might
in a nonintimate partnership context, but rather as benefits that accrue to the
unit as a whole. "Sharing the advantages of life together as well as its difficulties is the linchpin of [the marital] community." 105

102
103
104

Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 82.
/d.

/d. at 83 (quoting Simon Gardner, Rethinking Family Propeny, 109
(1993)).
105
!d. at 82.

LAW

Q. REv. 263, 283
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Second, Frantz and Dagan believe that spouses are expected to make
roughly comparable contributions to the marriage. That said, these contributions need not have comparable market values. What is critical is
spouses' commitment to long-term reciprocity of effort and personal investment.106 Another central pillar of Frantz and Dagan's ideal of marriage
is the principle of equality. "[I]t would be perverse," they write, "to conceive of a marriage ... where one spouse has a recognized controlling interest in the property that partially constitutes the marriage, and,
correspondingly, in marital decisions .... As subordination in marriage is
a threat to a spouse's basic personhood, the marital community must be
bounded by a commitment to equality." 107
Extrapolating from these ideas, I posit that marriage at its core should
be understood as a commitment by spouses not only to labor for the unit,
but also to share more broadly in the opportunities and vulnerabilities that
characterize who they are financially for the duration of their union. As
Milton Regan put it, by marrying, "[s]pouses agree in essence to pool their
risks in face of an uncertain future." 108 Money shapes our identities in fundamental ways. It determines where we live, the kind of work we do, and
the level of medical care we receive. 109 Money and money worries play a
central role in our sense of safety or danger, possibility or constraint, peace
or anxiety. Sharing risks and rewards enables spouses to combine these
core elements of their individual identities during marriage.
This theory of marriage as a merger of risk and reward is consistent
with widely held contract-based and normative intuitions. Most Americans
assume that marriage turns separate individuals into a risk-sharing unit.
Most people would also agree that requiring only workers to share is unfair.
What, then, does the merger of risk and reward translate into? Marriage as merger of risk and reward clearly supports the sharing of earnings.
Earnings are power. Earnings shape one's sense of security, freedom, and
opportunity, influencing decisions that in a marriage necessarily impact
both spouses-whether and when to have children, what type of schooling
and healthcare they will receive, where to live, and how much money
should be set aside for emergencies. Allowing the high-earning spouse to
106
/d. at 89-90 ("Communal marriage does not require that a spouse accept an arrangement where
she is being exploited, expected to expend a disproportionate amount of effort, and yet reaping relatively
little in the way of reward. There are, in other words, limits to acceptable asymmetric contribution
within the ideal of communal marriage. But these limits are not based on the metric of desert for labor
in the sense of each spouse insisting upon receiving benefits in proportion to individual market-valued
contribution. Instead, marriage operates on a metric focused on individual effort. Though the joint endeavor need not be the product of similar market contributions, it should be the product of similar personal investments in the success of the marital endeavor." (emphasis added)).
107 /d. at 9 I.

108

note t, at 147.
For a poignant account of the relationship between wealth and health, see Janny Scott, Life at the
Top in America Isn't Just Better, It's Longer, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,2005, at AI.
109
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retain earnings separately would go against the heart of the notion that marriage means a joining of lots.
Before addressing the concrete implications of this view of marriage as
a union of risks and rewards, it should be noted that although the main flaw
of the current paradigm is its exclusive focus on contributions of labor, this
is not to say that spouses do not presently conceive of the fruits of marital
labor as a joint endeavor. They often do. But the lens through which
spouses view "contribution" is not exclusively tied to labor; it is broader.
In marriage, contribution includes many things that go beyond the pooling
of work and earnings. Spouses who are a good team set aside their individual preferences for the benefit of one another, making sacrifices that from a
purely monetary perspective may seem wasteful: they move to new cities so
their partner can take a job that is more rewarding, they take up hobbies
they would otherwise happily live without, they tend to in-laws, they
change their religious affiliation, they confront their demons, they compromise. Marriage works when spouses engage in a carefully calibrated dance
that leaves both partners feeling safe and valued.
A key ingredient of fairness between husbands and wives is their willingness to make relatively similar sacrifices for the benefit of the collective
unit. While Frantz and Dagan are correct that striking a fair balance in
these sacrifices-or "personal investments"-is necessarily subjective to
each couple, it is not true that all such sacrifices are impossible to measure
and enforce externally. A breadwinning husband may contribute to marriage in any number of unquantifiable ways, but his wages are clearly quantifiable elements of his financial capability during marriage, and as such,
they are properly classified as marital at divorce. A spouse who owns premarital or gifted property also has a clearly quantifiable degree of financial
capability during marriage. Exempting this capability from the marital
community is inconsistent with the view of marriage as an all-for-one
proposition.
On its face, the view of marriage as merger of risk and reward implies
that sharing should be total, however and whenever property is acquired. If
marriage truly represents a complete fusion-an identity of interests, risks,
and aspirations-allowing spouses to retain extramarital wealth cuts against
the very heart of the notion that they have thrown their lots together. Frantz
and Dagan acknowledge this but reject a complete merger rule on expediency grounds, arguing that the reality of multiple marriages would render it
unfair and unworkable. Total merger would privilege first spouses and
their children over propertied individuals' subsequent families. As the authors put it:
If preexisting property were included in the marital community, the first marriage would be privileged over others that may come later. The first spouse
would share not only the fruits of the marriage, but also the fruits of the other
spouse's premarital activities. To avoid the complete colonization of a
spouse's life, thus penalizing subsequent marriages, law must acknowledge the
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possibility, however undesirable, that the period of marriage (and thus sharing)
may come to an end. Therefore, spouses should be expected to share the benefits and burdens of their life together, not those of their lives before ... the existence of the marital community. 110

But this concession to reality lacks conviction. Rather, I suggest that a
total merger of all property is wrong in principle, because marriage commits
spouses to share upside and downside potential only so long as they are
married. 111 Even where neither party remarries, after divorce the paths of
ex-spouses typically diverge. Just as a spouse entering marriage with a certain earning capacity must generally share only income earned during marriage, a spouse entering marriage with separate property should have to
share only part of that property, a part that corresponds to the freedom and
risk which that money bestows during the marriage. 112 Classifying all preexisting and unearned property as marital would be as nonsensical as classifying all spouses' pre- and post-divorce earnings as marital. With few
exceptions, postdivorce earnings belong to ex-spouses individually. The
traditional partnership-theory rationale for this rule is that they were not a
product of labor expended during the marriage. A more sensible rationale
is that postdivorce earnings are not a part of the couple's collective financial
capability during the marriage. 113 By the same token, property currently
classified as separate should be allocated at divorce between two categories-one attributable to the marriage and the other attributable to the owner
spouse's postdivorce life. In other words, if we think of the freedom contained in a given asset as something that can be spread over the owner's expected lifespan, the part spread over the years of the marriage-and only
that part-should be classified as marital property divisible at divorce.
2. The Risk and Reward Allocation Formula.-What would this concept translate into in practice? The risk and reward formula attributes property acquired before marriage-preexisting property-to the marriage in the
same proportion as the duration of the marriage bears to the length of time
the property would have been expected to last-the owner's life expectancy
as of the start of the marriage. In other words, marital property includes:
Value of preexisting
property

110

X

Length of the marriage
Owner spouse's life expectancy

Frantz & Dagan, supra note I 0, at 113.
As Frantz and Dagan put it, "spouses should be expected to share the benefits and burdens of
their life together, not those of their lives before (or after) the existence of the marital community." /d.
112
Unlike income, which is reasonably expected to continue with some regularity after the marriage
ends, preexisting property and one-time gratuitous receipts frequently will not. On the contrary, they are
expected to last over time, for a period extending much beyond the year in which they were received.
113
But see Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 363--64 (arguing that marital roles influence postdivorce
earning power).
111
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Property received during marriage-gifted or inherited propertyshould be attributed to the marriage in the same proportion as the property's
holding period (the length of time from receipt until the commencement of
divorce proceedings) bears to the owner's life expectancy as of receipt.
Thus, marital property also includes:
Value of gifted or
inherited property

Holding period
Owner spouse's life expectancy

X

For example, assume Husband and Wife are both thirty years old when
they marry. They are both expected to live until eighty .114 Husband enters
the marriage with $1 million. Wife has no preexisting property.

Husband's Age:

30

40

50

60

70

80

Life Expectancy

Ten years later, when the spouses are forty, they divorce. At that time
the husband's entire $1 million in preexisting holdings are intact. In order
to figure out how much of the husband's property will be attributed to the
marriage, we will need to spread the $1 million evenly over his life expectancy.
Preexisting Assets Spread Over Life Expectancy:
$1,000,000

Husband's Age:

30

40

50

60

70

80

~
Marriage

114
For simplicity, this example and the following use eighty as the average life expectancy for all
individuals. In fact, life expectancy rises with age and is generally higher for women than for men. For
a succinct table correlating age, gender, and life expectancy, see Social Security Online, Actuarial Publications, Period Life Table, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
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The portion allocable to the marriage will bear the same proportion to
the total property as the length of the marriage bears to his life expectancy-in other words, one-fifth (ten years of marriage divided by his fiftyyear life expectancy). Thus $200,000 will be classified as marital property
subject to division at divorce. The remaining $800,000 will be his separate
property.
Separate:
$800,000

Marital:
$200,000

,......-- "_,..--

(
Husband's Age:

'"

~,,----·

-,

~~

'..,.--·

"-__.-~~/-

/.'

30

40

50

60

70

80

~
Marriage

If Husband and Wife are twenty when they marry and thirty when they
divorce, the applicable ratio would be one-sixth (ten years of marriage divided by Husband's sixty-year life expectancy) and only $166,667 of the $1
million would be marital, leaving the husband with $833,333 for his longer
postdivorce life.
Suppose again the spouses are thirty years old when they marry, but instead of entering the marriage with his $1 million, the husband inherits it
eight years into the marriage when he is thirty-eight years old. In that case
the inheritance will be classified using the second equation. It will be attributed to the marriage based on the length of time from receipt to divorce
and on his life expectancy as of the date of receipt. Thus, dividing the holding period, two years, by life expectancy as of receipt, forty-two years,
gives 1/21. Thus, 1121 ofthe inheritance, or $47,619, will be classified as
marital.
By integrating the age of the owner spouse as well as the length of the
marriage or holding period, the formula arrives at a recharacterization percentage that is both principled and fair. It requires both spouses to contribute comparably out of the resources available to them during the
marriage-whether acquired before or during marriage, through labor or
luck-thus joining their efforts as well as their allocable-to-the-marriage
fortunes. The life expectancy component of the formula translates each
spouse's wealth into a figure that represents what that wealth means to them
during the marriage. The result ensures that similar levels of financial risk
and security are attributed to both parties even where the spouses enter marriage with disproportionate external resources. At the same time, it protects
affluent spouses by limiting the amount by which a failed marriage may deplete their estate to one-half of the recharacterization percentage-in short1654
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term marriages this amount will be relatively small. The parties' life expectancy would be based on an objective standard, such as the actuarial tables
promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service. 115
The system would treat all income from separate property as marital
regardless of whether it represents the fruits of either spouse's labor.
Again, income would belong to the marriage only for its duration; thus, a
propertied spouse would only be contributing for the fraction of her lifetime
during which she is married. Like earnings, income from separate property
represents a slice of ongoing financial capability, which, if kept separate,
would put spouses in fundamentally different positions. The same is true of
distributions from trusts. Like income, they would be classified as marital
property.
A portion of debts incurred prior to marriage would be characterized as
marital according to the same formula applicable to premarital property.
Thus if the wife marries at thirty with $10,000 in debt from medical treatments and the marriage lasts ten years, one-fifth (ten years of marriage divided by fifty years in life expectancy) of that debt, or $2000, will be
marital. Debts incurred during marriage would be marital unless they were
incurred to maintain separate property, in which case they would be attributed to the marriage in the same proportion as the underlying property.
115

The U.S. Department of Treasury publishes these tables for purposes of valuing annuities, interests for life or terms of years, and remainder or reversionary interests. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL'N NO. 1457, ACTUARIAL VALUES BOOK ALEPH (2007).
Some jurisdictions already consider spouses' ages in divorce proceedings. However, age is generally
related to the spouses' postdivorce needs rather than the backward-looking entitlement accrued in the
course of marriage. Under my proposal, by contrast, age functions as an aid in determining the subjective financial capability of each spouse for the duration of marriage. See, e.g., Maynard v. King, 906
A.2d 849, 852 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2006) (holding that a sixty-forty division of property in favor of the husband was appropriate, in part, because "[h ]usband is clearly in worse health than wife, and also has the
disadvantage of having less opportunity for future advancement and increases in salary because of his
age"); Heinz v. Heinz, 632 N.W.2d 443, 449 (N.D. 2001) (affirming the trial court's award of spousal
support in part because the likelihood of the wife to "substantially increas[ e] her earnings by obtaining a
bachelor's degree is lessened by the difficulty she may have entering the job market at an advanced
age"); see also Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 236, C236B:25
(McKinney 1999) ("The age and health of the parties are ... relevant to consideration of the future financial conditions of the parties. Advanced age or ill health may preclude a spouse from the pursuit of a
full-time career and may, thus, warrant receipt of a greater share of marital assets .... [R]elative youth
may indicate that the spouse would be able to achieve relative financial security by his or her own efforts."). When parties are of roughly equivalent age, health, and economic station, courts are reluctant
to award one spouse a greater share of the marital estate or invade a spouse's separate property for the
benefit of the other. See Wiegers v. Wiegers, 467 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that
an invasion of nonmarital property for the other spouse was unwarranted because both parties were elderly, in poor health, and neither had any likelihood of obtaining employment or acquiring additional assets, and thus, neither party could demonstrate that a hardship was created by a property distribution that
did not include an award of either party's nonmarital property to the other); cf Edinger v. Edinger, 724
N.W.2d 852, 856 (S.D. 2006) (holding that the trial court's award of the parties' entire net worth to the
husband was inequitable "considering the parties' similar age, health, competence to earn a living, and
contributions to the accumulation of property").
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Thus, if the wife incurs the medical debt in year five of the marriage, the
entire amount would be marital. Suppose instead that the wife marries
owning a $300,000 summer home and during the marriage borrows $30,000
to maintain the property. If the marriage lasts ten years out of her fifty-year
life expectancy, then at divorce one-fifth of the house, or $60,000, would be
marital property, and one-fifth of the debt, or $6000, would also be considered incurred to maintain the marital property. The remaining debt of
$24,000 would be separate. 116 Mirroring the treatment of interest earned in
the course of marriage, interest payments made during marriage would be
marital.
As in the examples above, the recharacterization percentage would be
based on the value of assets at the front end: premarital assets would be
valued at the outset of marriage, and gifts and devises would be valued
when received. Nonliquid assets would be valued a second time at the back
end-i.e., at divorce-to determine their appreciation or depreciation,
which would be attributed in full to the marriage. This rule ensures that ap. preciation of separate property is attributed to the marriage in the same
fashion as income and that depreciation is attributed in the same fashion as
debt.
Thus, in the first example above, if our thirty-year-old husband enters
the marriage with a house worth $1 million, and if ten years later the house
is worth $1.6 million, in addition to one-fifth of the front-end value
($200,000) being marital, the entire $600,000 in appreciation would be
marital as well. As a result, the proposal removes the current uncertainty
surrounding the treatment of income from and appreciation of separate
property. In jurisdictions that treat separate property-generated income as
marital and appreciation as separate, the proposal would eliminate the artificial incentive to invest separate property in non-income-producing assets.
If the value of the husband's house fell, say to $900,000, then one-fifth of
the initial $1 million, or $200,000, would be marital, but also the entire
$100,000 loss would be marital. Thus the final accounting for the house
would produce $100,000 for the marital pot.
Separate property spent during marriage would be presumptively marital. Thus, in the first example where the husband brought $1 million into
the marriage, if more than $200,000 of this amount were spent in the course
of the ten-year marriage, there would be no credit to his separate account at
divorce. Whatever was left would simply be separate. If less than the
$200,000 allocable to the marriage were spent, say $50,000,_ then $150,000

116

For current treatment of debts, see Brett R. Turner, Division of Debts upon Divorce, EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION J., June 2003, at 61 (evaluating the process for division of debts, such as ascertaining
whether a legal obligation exists, determining whether the debt is marital or personal (like a gambling
debt), deciding whether the debt is a result of dissipation, and considering methods of apportioning or
allocating the debt).
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of the remaining funds would be designated marital at divorce, and the
same $800,000 as before would remain separate.
The system would replace transmutation by use, which, in the states
that apply it, essentially punishes separate property holders for sharing their
property during marriage. m The proposed formula would eliminate this
perverse result and the harmful incentive structure it sets up. Similarly,
commingled property would not necessarily be deemed marital. Untangling
separate and marital property commingled in the course of marriage would
require a tracing process similar to that currently employed in many divorce
cases. This process can be especially complex when withdrawals are made
from an account containing both types of property, and authorities are split
as to the correct treatment of such withdrawals. 118 The proposed system
would present similar tracing challenges; though complex, they would not
be more onerous than the challenges under the current system and would be
solvable using the same range of methods currently available. Other valuation issues-for example, the valuation of trusts and family businesseswould also pose difficulties no more complex than those that already riddle
valuation of property at divorce. 119 The risk and reward approach would
also incorporate existing doctrines dealing with waste or dissipation of
marital assets. 120
Spouses would be permitted to contract out of the system-whether
prior to or during marriage. Such opt-out would only be possible by mutual
agreement. By contrast, the ALI's and Frantz and Dagan's more liberal
opt-out approaches permit one party to unilaterally change the rules of the
marriage midstream. However, if there is no premarital agreement, a
spouse who wishes to keep separate a gift or inheritance received during
marriage, and is unable to obtain the other party's consent, may disclaim
the gift. Disclaiming would not override the proposed allocation rule; it
would simply revert the property to the donor in the case of a gift or cause it
to pass to the next beneficiary under the will. This result would be prefer117

See Oldham, supra note I, at 246 ("[Transmutation by use] punishes generous spouses for allowing the other spouse to use separate property. Spouses who hoard are rewarded.").
118
For a discussion of the various methods currently used in dealing with withdrawals from commingled accounts, see OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.03( 1]-(2].
119
See Brett R. Turner, Interests in Trnsts as Marital Property, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J., Sept.
2004, at 97 (describing the different property treatments of revocable trusts, irrevocable trusts, income
interests, and remainder interests).
120
Waste or dissipation of marital assets is a relevant factor in property settlements. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1)(i) (West 2007); IND. CODE § 31-15-7-4 (2007); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236B(l)(d)(ll) (McKinney 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-5-16.1 (2007); see also OLDHAM, supra note
15, § 13.02[l][d]. If a spouse is guilty of dissipating the marital estate, those assets are charged against
the spouse in an equitable distribution. Stated alternatively, the dissipating spouse will receive a smaller
portion of the marital estate to compensate for his or her wasteful activities. See, e.g., Schneider v.
Schneider, 864 So. 2d 1193, 1196--97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Jonsson v. Jonsson, 715 So. 2d 1064,
1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Newby v. Newby, 734 N.E.2d 663,667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Reaney v.
Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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able to a rigid application of the proposal where the rectptent of a gift
wishes to use the funds to take care of other family members such as a disabled parent or sibling. In such a case, a rule requiring that the gift be
shared with the recipient's spouse would be inappropriate.
Donor intent, on the other hand, should not override the proposed recharacterization rule. The rule is geared toward making property settlements and divorce fairer, and marriages more harmonious. Donors who
condition their gifts by prohibiting recipient spouses from sharing jeopardize these values. Thus, just as current caselaw disregards conditions encouraging divorce as contrary to public policy, 121 conditions limiting
spousal sharing of gifts should also be disregarded. 122
Where divorce proceedings are already underway, none of the gifts or
inheritances received would be subject to the proposed rule. The length-ofmarriage and holding-period "clocks" would also cease to toll for purposes
of calculating the recharacterization percentage on previously acquired
property. The precise moment of dissolution would be determined according to the same methods currently in use. 123
Once the classification stage is complete, marital property would be
divided with a presumption in favor of equal division because the central
premise of the system is attributing equal freedom and risk to both parties
during marriage. Spouses owning assets carrying a sentimental value
would have a right of first purchase. Where the value of these assets exceeds fifty percent of the marital pot, an equitable distribution would be determined on a case-by-case basis. 124

B. Added Benefits
Like the partnership theory, the proposed paradigm ensures that
homemakers are compensated for their labor. But unlike the partnership
theory, this approach does not impose an artificial fiction. Rather than pretending that monetary and nonmonetary contributions have the same value,
121
See In re Estate of Newalla, 837 P.2d 1373, 1379 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Graves v. First Nat'!
Bank in Grand Forks, 138 N.W.2d 584,588-89 (N.D. 1965); Fineman v. Cent. Nat'! Bank of Cleveland,
175 N.E.2d 837,842 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
122
See Frantz & Dagan, supra note I0, at 117 ("To be separate, the donor must intend the property
for only one of the spouses-gifts and inheritances to both spouses are marital property as a matter of
course. While donor intent currently determines the designation of such assets as marital or separate
property, it should not be dispositive. After all, most employers intend to pay wages to only one spouse,
but this is irrelevant to the classification of wages earned during marriage as marital property.").
123
SeeOLDHAM,supranote 15.
124
Frantz and Dagan believe that in such cases the entire property should be assigned to the original
owner. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 118. In addition to producing unfair results--e.g., where
earnings accumulated by the other spouse were used to maintain the property during marriage-this rule
creates an incentive on the part of propertied families to give married beneficiaries only or primarily
nonliquid property so as to avoid the application of the sharing rule. As already indicated, postdivorce
support payments-alimony-and the relevance of fault in the distribution of marital property are outside the scope of this Article.
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the proposal matches most people's intuition that husbands' and wives'
various contributions to marriage cannot and need not be compared. It also
recognizes that spouses often contribute unequally at different points in
their relationship as employment and health circumstances change. Indeed,
in terms of labor contributed, some marriages are unequal from start to finish. The proposal embodies the notion that matrimony fuses spouses' risks
and rewards regardless of their relative contributions of labor.
If adopted, the proposed marital property regime would likely impact
attitudes toward separate property during marriage. 125 It would also likely
recast the sharing that already occurs within healthy marriages. Many
propertied spouses share at least some of their separate wealth with their
partner, often more than would be required under the proposed system. 126
But while working spouses share because they are obliged to, beneficiaries
of gifted or inherited wealth share as a favor--out of "generosity." This
imbalance breeds tension and resentment. By devising an objective formula
for how much sharing is fair and logical, the proposal serves an expressive
function, relabeling sharing that already occurs as a basic marital duty.
Likewise, the proposal would ensure that spouses' employment decisions are informed by a comparable sense of freedom and risk. Under the
current paradigm, the fact that spouses' separate property remains sheltered
from the marriage means that spouses with significant differences in premarital and unearned property are likely to have widely divergent exposure
to risk and therefore fundamentally different attitudes about work. The
proposal turns spouses with disproportionate outside safety nets into members of a team for the duration of the marriage.
Though couples would be permitted to override the proposed formula
by private contract, some propertied brides and grooms may find that the
new paradigm obviates the need for a "prenup." The reasonable limitations
that the proposal places on the amount of separate property subject to divi125

On the potential effects of divorce law on ongoing marriages, see ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2,
§ 4.12 cmt. a, at 772; Frantz & Dagan, supra note I 0, at 97-98 ("[T]o the extent that law can ever affect
social understandings, marital law is at the center of public awareness and debate ... [and] many parties
to ongoing marriages have themselves been divorced, or are at least intimately familiar with the divorce
of a close friend or relative. While most spouses may not know all of the legal details, they may be affected by their accumulated impact: the experiences, practices, and social expectations generated by the
principles underlying the legal dogma."); Williams, Do Wives Own Half!, supra note 12, at 269.
126
See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12 reporter's notes cmt. a. Financial advisor Bedda
D'Angelo also reports that:
In 3 7 years ... I have never met anyone who did not expect to share I 00% of everything they
owned before marriage with their spouse. . . . Couples that have been married only once for a
number of years do not even remember they once owned assets separately and when one of them
inherits, they almost immediately re-title assets so that they are jointly owned. Likewise with
spousal pension benefits. It is a whole different ball game if even one spouse has been married before. Divorced or widowed, I have never met anyone who did not expect to retain the assets they
brought into the marriage in their own name.
E-mail from Bedda D'Angelo, President, Fiduciary Solutions, to author (Aug. I I, 2007, 3:20 EST) (on
file with author).
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sion at divorce is likely to alleviate some wealthy fiances' concerns, sparing
them and their future spouses the anguish that often surrounds premarital
agreement negotiations. For spouses who do wish to write their own contract and for life partners who seek to formalize a commitment other than
through civil marriage, the proposed allocation system provides an objective, anxiety-reducing starting point for a sharing plan that is both safe and
just. Finally, at the divorce stage, even if legislatures or courts do not adopt
the view of marriage as merger of risk and reward, for couples engaged in
collaborative negotiations it offers a yardstick that is fairer and clearer than
many of the doctrines currently in use. 127

C. Potential Objections
The proposal raises a number of potential objections. First, the system
effectively spreads wealth equally over an owner's life, whereas in fact
many people spend different amounts at different stages in life. Some owners view their capital as something they will use only at retirement or in
case of an emergency. Others expect to leave most of it to individual beneficiaries or to charity. At the opposite pole, some people's spending patterns would imply that their capital should be frontloaded. A wife who uses
most of her premarital assets to purchase a home on day one of the marriage
has fundamentally affected the couple's life at the front end.
This objection, however, misconstrues the conceptual framework of
shared risk and reward. The idea behind the proposed system is not that
property owners are likely to spend the full amount attributed to any given
year. Rather, allocating the property annually reflects the power to spend,
save, or give for that slice of time and ensures that the emotional repercussions of this power are shared during the marriage. A husband who reserves every penny of his inheritance for old age still enjoys this money
long before he retires. The formula turns a yearly slice of this security into
something shared. A wife who uses her inheritance to purchase a home
may have spent her capital upfront, but the house she purchased is expected
to last over time. The formula turns this large front-end contribution into
something the husband will share in more and more over time. If the marriage dissolves three years later, the husband will not be entitled to half of
the house. Naturally, even the emotional repercussions of the power to
spend, save, or gift will vary from year to year. A big career break may diminish one's emotional reliance on a financial safety net. A professional
setback or a serious illness may increase this reliance. Allocating risk and
reward over life expectancy provides a simple and objective conceptual rubric that will, on average, balance power in marriage more effectively than
the current paradigm.

127

1120.
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Second, a parallel objection applies to the inclusion of all marital earnings in the joint marital pot. Especially in professions that generate widely
fluctuating income streams, the earnings rule may attribute to marriage income that in terms of a spouse's long-term economic realities should be attributed to the spouse over many years. For example, shortly after her
wedding a writer sells for a lump sum a manuscript she had been working
on for many years. Should the marriage dissolve shortly thereafter, attributing the entire spike in her income to the marriage seems unfair. This problem is the sort of inevitable side effect that any bright-line rule produces. In
practice it could be dealt with through an exception to the formula which
would be triggered when a substantial spike in income is apparent. 128
Third, one might object that because the owner spouse's life expectancy is in the denominator of the formula, a greater proportion of late-tomarry spouses' separate property will be recharacterized at divorce. The
logic, again, is that because they have less time to live, the same amount
will take them further than it would have in their youth, and this sense of
freedom and security should be shared in marriage. Elderly brides and
grooms who expect to leave significant amounts in their will would thus be
jeopardized by the rule as a larger proportion of their assets would be
deemed marital, just as they and their beneficiaries are jeopardized by current elective share statutes. Elective share statutes generally allow the disinherited spouse to claim a significant portion of the testator's estate, 129 and
sometimes this estate includes all property titled in the testator's name, including assets that would be deemed separate had the marriage ended in divorce. 130 Seniors who do not expect to spend most of their estate during
their own lifetime and who would like to control its passage after death are
free to either gift their property before they marry or draft a premarital
agreement opting out of the default divorce and elective share rules.
Marriage should have real consequences. It should not be the loose,
economically insignificant symbolic marker that the labor-centered rule
makes it for couples who meet after their significant income-generating
years. Marriage is different from an intimate relationship where the merging of fates is not an essential element. Some couples--old and youngkeep all finances separate, some share only household expenses, and others
pool assets on an ad hoc basis. The disappearance of the taboo against cohabitation means that unmarried couples can now choose from a range of

128

For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of income averaging in tax policy literature, see Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
395 (2003); Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REv. 1151 (2006); Lee
Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 TAX L. REv. I (2005); Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509.
129
OOBRIS ET AL., supra note 60, at 147.
130
See Rosenbury, supra note I, at 1245-46.
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private contracting options to formalize their arrangement. 131 The growing
acceptance of premarital agreements today means that married couples can
also pick and choose among a range of alternatives, creating their own rules
for how much, if any, property is shared during marriage and upon dissolution.
In light of this range of choices, if the law continues to use marriage as
an eligibility criterion for special treatment, marriage should carry real economic significance. Indeed, income, gift, and estate tax benefits as well as
bankruptcy advantages available only to spouses are premised on an assumption that husband and wife form one economic unit. Economically
united spouses can be seen as earning the government benefits they receive;
their promise to take care of each other in sickness and in health, for richer
or for poorer, reduces the likelihood taxpayers will have to pay for one of
them falling through the cracks. Thus, the exchange-benefits for commitment-is rational on both ends. Elsewhere I have argued that tax and
other benefits should be limited to couples who are in fact legally obligated
to share their resources, regardless of their marital status. 132 But seeing that
marriage-based eligibility criteria for public benefits are unlikely to change
soon, there are compelling arguments to prohibit premarital agreements that
erode economic unity in marriage. 133 This is also unlikely, as the trend has
been towards broader acceptance of private ordering in marriage. But at the
very least, the default rules of marriage should reflect the economic unity
with which the institution is presumed to be synonymous. Placing the burden on couples who do not wish to merge risk and reward is correct because
marriage matters. It matters enough to warrant benefits; these benefits
should be linked to real spousal obligations.
131

See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2007); D.C. CODE § 32-702 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 572C-I to -7 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 26:8A-1 to -4 (West 2008); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106
(Cal. 1976); Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1982); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 6; Cynthia
Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States, 26 LAW & POL'Y 119 (2004);
William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique,
2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (surveying domestic partnership laws in the United States); Ann Laquer Estin,
Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1381 (2001); Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage
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Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435 (2001).
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Motro, supra note 8; Shari Motro & Peter Smallwood, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2007, §A, at 12; Shari Motro, Op-Ed., The I.R.S.'s Shotgun Marriage, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 14, 2006, §A,
at 21.
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See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule,
53 CLEV. Sr. L. REv. 359, 397-98 (2005-06) ("Prenuptial agreements should be held per se unenforceable to the extent they purport to limit a spouse's entitlements to alimony or equitable distribution of
property in the event of divorce. To allow married persons to cherry-pick the concomitants of their marriage-to avail themselves of the advantages the law confers upon them while evading, by governing
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Fourth, using objective actuarial standards to determine the parties' life
expectancies could cause distortions where parties are likely to die before or
outlive their projected mortality dates. The terminally ill propertied spouse
would thus benefit from an overly optimistic life expectancy, which would
spread assets more thinly over the years of a failed marriage. The unusually
healthy spouse would be harmed because the formula would divide the
length of the marriage by a denominator that is smaller than is appropriate.
The distortion in favor of the terminally ill would strike most people as tolerable. At the opposite extreme, the unusually healthy who outlive their life
expectancy would admittedly suffer under the proposal. But keep in mind
that even where the divorce occurs after the expected mortality date of the
property owning spouse, no more than fifty percent of marital property
would go to the nonpropertied spouse. If the propertied spouse managed to
outlive his or her projected life expectancy as of the date of marriage, the
marriage is likely to have lasted long enough so that some of these separate
assets were shared. Thus, the result under the proposed formula would be
no more onerous than current transmutation doctrines.
Fifth, some might argue that by linking recharacterization to length of
marriage, the formula encourages divorce. A propertied spouse in a rocky
marriage pays a price for every additional year spent trying to make the
marriage work. But this is equally true under the current rule when instead
of separate property, one spouse earns significantly more than the other.
Every additional year of marriage translates into an additional year of earnings being deemed marital. Ultimately, spouses teetering on the edge of divorce often engage in mercenary calculations surrounding spending and
accumulating assets so as to maximize their postdivorce positions, and the
proposed system would neither curb nor exacerbate these behaviors.
Finally, the implications of the proposal for a non-wage-earning spouse
who owns separate property and who performs the brunt of the couple's
housework and childcare may initially seem unfair. Such a spouse would
be forced to contribute to the marriage "twice"-with labor as well as with
property. But this objection is rooted in a contribution-of-labor view of
marital equity. In terms of risks and rewards, a stay-at-home spouse whose
unearned or premarital wealth remains intact is effectively allowed to hedge
her bets. By turning a portion of this outside safety net into a part of the
couple's joint decisionmaking calculus, the proposal forces nonearning
spouses-often women-to contribute to the marriage comparably in terms
of risk. For wives who now leave the workforce relying on separate wealth
should their marriage fail, the rule would create an incentive to stay put. In
the long-term, it may curb the exodus of elite-educated women from the
workforce-the so-called "opt-out revolution." 134 Again, where the non134

The opt-out revolution refers to the perceived trend of highly educated, professional women who
leave the workforce to become stay-at-horne mothers. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK (2006);
Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. nMEs, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 42; Linda R.
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wage earner has no premarital assets and receives no gifts or inheritances
during the marriage, the formula would have no effect.
The system also protects non- or low-wage earners who rely on their
spouse's premarital or unearned resources. Thus, for example, a full-time
mother married to a man who spends most of his time managing the charitable foundation he founded with inherited wealth will be entitled to a portion of the money that informed both spouses' decisions during marriagethe wife's decision to care for the couple's children and the husband's decision to forgo gainful employment. Where the primary earner also has substantial separate property, the proposal ensures that both spouses face
similar risks, reducing the vulnerability of the nonpropertied spouse who
earns little or nothing.
V. CONCLUSION

An extreme example of the poisonous effects of imbalances in husbands' and wives' financial security can be seen in the film Fargo. The
film is based on the true story of an unsuccessful car salesman who attempts
to have his wife kidnapped in order to share in the ransom proceeds that her
father-a successful businessman-would pay over. Early in the story we
learn that the spouses do not share in life's risks and rewards, a fact that becomes apparent when the husband appeals to his father-in-law to help him
invest in a real estate project. If the venture is successful, he explains, it
could work out very well for him, his wife Jean, and their son Scotty. The
father-in-law dismisses him without so much as glancing in his direction.
"Jean and Scotty," he says, "will never have to worry [about money]." The
husband then finalizes the kidnapping plot, with tragic results. 135
Frantz and Dagan were right: "[L]abor should not be the standard for
inclusion in the marital estate--even the fruits of good luck ... ought to be
marital property." 136 This Article takes their observation to its logical conclusion. If marriage turns independent economic beings into a risk-sharing
team, the blanket exclusion of unearned and preexisting assets from marital
property is indefensible.
Property subject to division at divorce should reflect both spouses'
economic identity during marriage-including labor- and luck-generated
Hirshman, Homeward Bound, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2005, at 20; Claudia Wallis, The Case for Staying
Home, TIME, Mar. 22, 2004, at 51; Martha Lagace, Getting Back on Course, HARV. Bus. SCH.
WORKING KNOWLEDGE, Sept. 4, 2001, http:/lhbswk.hbs.edu!iteml2457.html ("Data collected from
women in the [HBS] reunion classes of 1981, 1986, and 1991 indicates that only 38 percent of the respondents from the three classes are currently working full time."); Posting of Richard Posner to The
Becker-Posner B log, http://www. becker-posner-blog.comlarchives/200 5/09/e1 ite_universit.html (Sept.
25, 2005, 21:17 CST) ("[Recent newspaper articles] confirm[}--what everyone associated with such
[elite] institutions has long known-that a vastly higher percentage of female than male students will
drop out of the work force to take care of their children.").
135
FARGO (MGM 1996).
136
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 117.
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property-regardless of source. This proposal spreads separate property
over the life of the owner spouse and allocates to the marriage a portion of
this property corresponding to the spouse's financial capability during the
union. The result yields a fairer and more predictable system than the current partnership-based divorce model. It removes inequities in the treatment of workers and owners, eliminates sharing disincentives, protects
propertied spouses from losing significant portions of their estates following short-lived marriages, bolsters the security of dependent spouses, and
offers an objective standard for sharing between spouses with disparate resources. Marriage should not mean one thing for workers and another for
those who acquire property in other ways. Rather, it should place both
spouses in the same boat. The proposal applies a comparable standard to
both earners and owners, tying together labor, luck, and love, for the benefit
of all.
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